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Introduction
The Ninth Amendment explicitly states that “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”   This seems to clearly indicate that there are1
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2. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1357-
61 (3d ed. 2003) (listing various unenumerated rights recognized by the Court); Jeffrey D.
Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth Amendment: Ways of Thinking About Unenumerated
Rights Inspired by Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate, 75 MISS. L.J. 495, 524 (2006). The
sources that the Court has used include the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, as well as guarantees implicit in many of the
other amendments.  See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-04 (1999) (recognizing a
Fourteenth Amendment right to travel within the United States and enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizens in the several states); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
278 (1990) (recognizing a Fourteenth Amendment due process “liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
(1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (recognizing an implicit right under the First
Amendment to attend and report on criminal trials); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965) (recognizing a “right of privacy” implicit in the “penumbras” created by the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(recognizing that Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes “the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects the right of a citizen “to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he
may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its
protection, to share its offices, [and] to engage in administering its functions.  He has the right
of free access to its seaports . . . subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several
States” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
44 (1867))).  The Slaughter-House Court further listed the right to demand the “protection of
the Federal government . . . when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign
government[,] . . . [t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, [and] . . . [t]he right to use the navigable waters of the
United States . . . [and to enjoy] all rights secured to our citizens by treaties.”  Id.  
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1, 11-21 (2006) (identifying and discussing the various historical models) [hereinafter Barnett,
rights other than those in the text of the Constitution that should be recognized
as constitutional.  Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
number of unenumerated rights under a variety of rationales.  2
Nevertheless, the question of how to identify and give form to these rights
still continues to pose problems for judges, lawyers, and legal scholars alike.
While the Ninth Amendment points to the existence of these other rights, it
gives no clue about what these additional rights are or how they might be
found and enforced.   Recent scholarship based on the history of the Ninth3
Amendment has sought to fill this void and has identified a number of theories
about what the unenumerated rights mentioned in the Ninth Amendment might
be.   Of these theories, the one most supported by the historical evidence is4
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/1
2010] BLACKSTONE’S NINTH AMENDMENT 169
Ninth Amendment].
5. See id. at 79-80.  But see Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004) (both arguing that newly interpreted historical
evidence suggests that the Ninth Amendment refers to the collective rights of the states). 
6. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII; see also cases cited supra note 2.  
7. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring
in judgment) (test is (1) whether the right is “exemplified by ‘the traditions from which [the
Nation] developed,’ or revealed by contrast with ‘the traditions from which it broke,’” and (2)
whether it outweighs the competing governmental interest (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23, 127
n.6 (1989) (test, according to Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, is whether the interest
in question is one traditionally protected by our society, based on an inquiry at “the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified”); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (test is whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (finding justification for the right to privacy through
“emanations” of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights that form “penumbras”); id. at 493-94
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (test is (1) whether the right in question is “so rooted” in the
“traditions and collective conscience” of the American people “that it cannot be denied without
violating fundamental principles of liberty and justice”; (2) whether it emanates from a specific
constitutional guarantee; or (3) whether it is necessary to the “requirements of a free society”
(original alteration omitted) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961), Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932))); id.
at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in  judgment) (question is whether the right is “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty” (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). 
that the “rights retained” mentioned in the Ninth Amendment are personal
rights belonging to the people as individuals, rather than collective rights of
“the people” as citizens of the states.   As such, the rights retained are of the5
same character as the others in the Bill of Rights and the fundamental rights
recognized by the Supreme Court.6
If this theory is correct, however, the question how these unenumerated
rights might be identified and given force still remains.  The U.S. Supreme
Court has attempted to set out doctrinal tests for identifying and enforcing
unenumerated rights in its substantive due process jurisprudence; however, no
consistent test has emerged.  Indeed, there seem to be almost as many tests to
adjudicate unenumerated rights as there are Justices to apply them.7
In looking at unenumerated rights and considering whether they are
fundamental, the Court employs several different tests that are variants on a
historical inquiry.  Under these tests, the Court looks to various historical
sources regarding rights in an attempt to discern a tradition concerning the
right at issue.  It then tries to evaluate this tradition against some sort of
standard to ascertain its importance, asking such questions as whether the right
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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8. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (original alteration omitted)
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
9. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.
10. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law:
Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2001) (criticizing the Court’s use of
the historical record).
11. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30-33 (1995); Mark C. Niles, Ninth
Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal
Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 108-16 (2000).
12. See, e.g., J. D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology of Unenumerated
Rights, 1999 MICH. ST. L. REV. 809, 828-32.
13. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 253-73 (2004).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 92-105.
at issue is grounded in the “‘collective conscience of [the American] people’”8
or whether the right is “traditionally protected by our society.”   9
The problem, however, is that these inquiries lack a coherent baseline from
which to begin.  In the absence of any agreement regarding a baseline, a
historical inquiry often becomes an exercise in rummaging through the
historical record and “cherry-picking” different statements made by
supposedly influential sources of rights at the time of the framing that support
the conclusion that a particular Justice wants to reach.   As a result, the10
Court’s version of history tends to come from a hodgepodge of sources,
without regard to how much these sources actually influenced the ways in
which particular rights were viewed by the framing generation.
In an attempt to provide courts with a consistent baseline or theme to
identify rights, various legal commentators have posited theories regarding
unenumerated rights.  Some of the most popular theories argue that the “rights
retained” are natural law rights, derived either from the writings of specific
natural law theorists such as John Locke,  from a combination of different11
natural law theorists,  or from some shared natural law idea of individual12
freedom.  13
As elegant as these theories are, they all face significant problems when
placed in a historical context.  Those theories arguing for rights based on
natural law theorists generally overstate the influence of these theorists on the
views of the framers, ratifiers, and, most important, the general public
regarding their rights.   Further, such theories underestimate the degree to14
which the rights existing at common law and the common law method of
rights adjudication formed the basis for the general person’s conception of his
or her rights at the time of the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/1
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15. See infra text accompanying notes 106-117.
16. For example, Barnett’s framework would cause the Court to abandon the tiered-scrutiny
approach that it has used since 1938.  See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).  Under Barnett’s theory, all liberty interests would be presumptively protected
by the Constitution, and laws infringing on those interests would be judged by a “necessary and
proper” standard.  See BARNETT, supra note 13, at 335-53 (discussing his framework in
comparison to existing doctrine).  Similarly, Niles’s framework would abandon tiered scrutiny
in favor of assessing the motives behind rights-infringing legislation.  See Niles, supra note 11,
at 135-43.
17. Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J.
309, 314 (1936).  
18. See id. at 313-14.  In what is generally considered to be the first “modern” Ninth
Amendment law review article, see Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the
Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 762 n.7 (1994), Kelsey theorized that the rights referenced
in the Ninth Amendment are the “natural . . . rights of Englishmen” exemplified by the writings
of Blackstone, Kelsey, supra note 17, at 314.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 223-26.
Rights.   Finally, these theories also suffer from a prudential problem.15
Because they would require a full-scale reworking of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence with regard to rights, they are unlikely to prove attractive to the
Court anytime soon.16
This article explores the common understanding of rights at the time of the
framing of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  It argues that while the
“rights retained” by the people as provided in the Ninth Amendment were
individual rights, they were not natural law rights in the sense that they
corresponded to the idea of rights articulated by any individual natural law
theorist, or even a combination of such theorists.  Rather, they were those
rights that the framing generation believed they inherited from English
constitutional and common law, with important modifications stemming from
the experiences of American colonists.  While the framing generation would
have considered these rights “natural” in the sense that they were preexisting,
the rights were not the “theoretical or philosophic” rights of natural law
theorists,  but instead rights based on the framing generation’s understanding17
of English constitutional law, common law, and tradition.   Further, for most18
Americans at the time of the framing, their conception of these rights was
informed not by the musings of John Locke and other natural law writers, nor
by the careful study of the common law decisions of Lord Coke, but by the
readily accessible summary of the common law provided by Sir William
Blackstone.   Thus, if the goal is to determine what was the general consensus19
among Americans at the time of the framing and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the formulation of rights in Blackstone’s Commentaries should form
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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20. See Kelsey, supra note 17, at 313.  
21. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551,
593-600 (2006) (advocating a common law-based originalism approach that would take into
account the common law and use it as a guide to shape the contemporary meaning of rights).
Meyler argues that the common law at the time of the framing was not a unified field and that
common law judges often reinterpreted the law to fit their respective time periods.  See id. at
593.  I agree with Meyler that, rather than try to determine “original intent” at the time of the
framing, we should look at problems today through the lens of the common law; however, we
disagree about the baseline that should be used.
22. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 885-86 (1985) (discussing originalist theories).
23. See id. at 886.
24. See 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 143 (Walter
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927) (comparing the controlling force of legislative history on statutory
interpretation with the force of Constitutional Convention proceedings on constitutional
interpretation).
25. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 27-29 (1997).
the baseline.   From that baseline, however, the common law concepts of20
custom and practice should be used to identify present-day rights.21
I. Historically Construing the Ninth Amendment: Whose Views Are
Important?
The first question that must be asked by anyone attempting to outline a
historical theory of unenumerated rights is one of methodology: whose views
of unenumerated rights should control?  Determining whose views are
important with respect to unenumerated rights is especially problematic
because of the peculiar way in which the Constitution deals with the concept
of rights.
 A notion often referred to in interpreting the Constitution in a historical
manner is the “original intent” of the framers.   This concept presupposes that22
we can look at the framers’ intentions in drafting the Constitution in the same
way that we might try to divine the intent of the legislature in enacting a
statute from the language used and the legislative history.   While this method23
is quite useful in the field of statutory interpretation, it has much less utility for
constitutional interpretation.   Looking to the intent of the legislature works24
in the statutory-interpretation arena because the legislature originates, debates,
and ultimately passes the legislation, subject to executive signing.   The25
legislature is thus the decision-making body with respect to what the
legislation means.  Consequently, the statements of legislative intent and the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/1
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26. See id. at 29; COOLEY, supra note 24, at 143.
27. COOLEY, supra note 24, at 143.
28. See id.
29. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
31. See COOLEY, supra note 24, at 124 (“The object of construction, as applied to a written
constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it.”).
debates surrounding a particular piece of legislation are highly probative in
determining what that legislation was designed to do.   26
The body of the U. S. Constitution, however, is fundamentally different
from ordinary legislation because it is the product of both a constitutional
convention and a state ratification process.   While the framers may have27
crafted the original language of the Constitution, this language had no force
until ratified by the state ratification conventions.   Because the state28
ratification conventions were the final decision-making bodies regarding the
language of the Constitution, the views of the framers concerning the meaning
of a particular passage are only relevant to the extent that they can be said to
have informed those bodies’ understandings of what that particular passage
meant.  James Madison recognized as much when he stated, “If we were to
look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the
instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which
proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the
Constitution.”   Thus, when dealing with original provisions in the29
Constitution, the pertinent question is, What would the ratifiers have thought
they were ratifying, informed as they were by the language, stated intent, and
debates of the framers, and the debates at the ratification conventions?
Interpreting constitutional amendments from a historical point of view
requires a different inquiry.  Amendments to the Constitution, such as those
contained in the Bill of Rights, are introduced and passed by Congress and
then ratified by the states, either through state legislatures or state
conventions.   In the same way that the ratifiers were the final decision makers30
with respect to the original Constitution, legislators and conventions are the
final arbiters of amendments.  Therefore, in determining what the particular
language of an amendment means, one should look to the understandings of
those persons in the state legislatures or state conventions that ratified the
amendment.   The intent of those members of Congress who introduced the31
amendment is relevant to the interpretation of the amendment in the same way
that the intent of the framers is relevant to the interpretation of the
Constitution; that is, the intent of Congress is relevant only to the extent that
it can be said to have informed the members of the legislatures or state
conventions that ratified the amendment—it is useful but not dispositive.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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32. Id.
33. Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning?  On Originalism,
Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (2007)
(discussing “The Rise of Public-Meaning Originalism”); see also Barnett, Ninth Amendment,
supra note 4, at 5-7 (discussing this model of constitutional interpretation).  
34. Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 5-6.  For further discussion of this method,
see BARNETT, supra note 13, at 92.
35. See BARNETT, supra note 13, at 113-16; Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 8-9.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
38. Cf. Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 7 (similarly contrasting the language
of the Commerce Clause with the language of the Ninth Amendment and concluding that the
pertinent inquiry with respect to the latter examines the “publicly known purpose” behind the
amendment’s inclusion).
39. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789-812 (2008).  Justice
Instead of focusing on the drafters of the amendment, the proper place to look
is to the views of the adopters.32
The unwieldiness of trying to discern intent, as well as questions over
whether intent should even matter, has led to a new form of originalist
interpretation: “public-meaning originalism.”   The original public-meaning33
method “looks to how a reasonable member of the public (including, but not
limited to, the framers and ratifiers) would have understood the words of the
text (in context) at the time of its enactment.”   By looking at the text itself34
rather than the specific intent of those enacting it, public-meaning originalism
seeks to avoid the problems associated with “original-intent” originalism.35
Nevertheless, when trying to determine the substance of unenumerated
rights in the Constitution, both “original-intent” and “original public-meaning”
originalism come up short.  Unenumerated rights occupy a unique position in
constitutional interpretation.  The text of the Ninth Amendment and the history
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution and the addition of the Bill of
Rights confirm their existence.  Yet, they are by nature outside the text of the
Constitution and thus cannot be looked at in quite the same way as we might
look at the meaning of “Commerce” in Article I,  or even the meaning of the36
“right of the people to keep and bear Arms” in the Second Amendment.   The37
Commerce Clause confers a power on the federal government, and the central
inquiry is what the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution intended the nature
and extent of that power to be, or, for public-meaning originalists, how the
language used in the Commerce Clause would have been understood by the
public at large.   The Second Amendment recognizes a right, and because the38
right is expressly stated in the Constitution, the Second Amendment’s
language and history can be probed to determine what was the general
understanding of the nature and extent of that right.39
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/1
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Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller used both text and history to determine that the Second
Amendment contains an individual right to possess firearms and that this right is broad enough
to encompass the right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.  See id.
40. See Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 895, 903 (2008) (noting that “[t]he Ninth Amendment . . . is neither a grant of power nor
a source of rights” (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.14 (2d
ed. 1988))).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 202-05.
42. This analytical approach is somewhat akin to the modified “original public-meaning”
method of historical interpretation employed by Randy Barnett in his Ninth Amendment
analysis arguing for an individual-rights interpretation.  See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra
note 4, at 7 (focusing on the “publicly known purpose” of the Ninth Amendment as shaping its
text).  A strict application of the “original public-meaning” method is not possible with regard
to interpreting unenumerated rights because, as discussed above, there is no actual text to
examine.  See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.  Nevertheless, the general idea is the same
in the sense that the public’s understanding is what matters.  But, instead of looking at the
public’s understanding of the Ninth Amendment’s text, we can look at what the general public
would have understood their rights to be at the time of the amendment’s adoption.
The Ninth Amendment, on the other hand, does not confer a right.   Rather,40
as will be seen, it simply evidences a whole body of preexisting rights.41
Because these rights are not stated in the text, the determinative question is
not, What did the framers, ratifiers, or members of Congress think they were
doing when they used certain language in the Constitution? or, What did the
members of the state legislatures who ratified the Ninth Amendment think they
were ratifying?  None of these individuals were the final arbiters of the Ninth
Amendment’s substance.  Rather, they were simply heirs to a tradition that
recognized the existence of the rights mentioned in that amendment.  Nor is
it useful to inquire into the “original public meaning” of the text itself, for all
the text can do is point us in the right direction by confirming the existence of
rights; it cannot give us their substance.  Instead, in order to determine what
rights are retained by the people, one must ask a broader question: what was
the general understanding of the rights possessed by individuals at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights?   To answer this42
question, it is necessary to start at the beginning.
II. The Ninth Amendment in Context: Whose Rights?
By now, almost everyone with any background in constitutional law knows
the thumbnail history of how the Ninth Amendment came to be.  Nevertheless,
understanding the historical view of unenumerated rights requires a close
examination of the framing and ratification of the Constitution as well as the
disputes that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, including the Ninth
Amendment.  In order to put this information into its proper context, it is first
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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43. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 290 (1996) (detailing the prevailing views of rights among the American
colonists).
44. See id. at 290-92.
45. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERTY 84 (2005) [hereinafter REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION]; see also FORREST
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 76
(1985).
46. MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 76.
47. The Petition of Right of 1628, instigated by Edward Coke, was aimed at curbing the
violations of rights by Charles I.  See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND:
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1992) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, GREAT
RIGHTS].  According to Schwartz, the Petition “declared the fundamental rights of Englishmen
as positive law.”  Id. at 11.
48. The 1689 Bill of Rights, which enacted the 1689 Declaration of Rights, was intended
to correct the abuses of James II and included the direct ancestor of the Eighth Amendment.
See id. at 21-23.
necessary to understand the preconceived views about rights held by the
framers of the Constitution, the members of Congress that crafted the Bill of
Rights, and the citizens of the young United States that ratified each of those
documents.  These views developed from a long line of traditional English
thought regarding rights, some of it grounded in fact and some of it
mythological.
A. The English Constitution and the Rule of Law
To begin understanding the thoughts of the framing generation on rights, it
is important to look at how that generation perceived rights.  As historian Jack
Rakove notes, the language of rights was the “native tongue” of eighteenth-
century Americans.   One of the main ideas that the American colonists43
inherited from their English ancestors was that they had a certain body of
rights and liberties, even if they could not articulate the exact content of those
rights and liberties.   Of one thing they were certain: the rights and liberties44
were not new.  According to a long-held tradition, these rights had as their
source an “ancient constitution” made up of laws and customs brought to
England by Saxons from Germany some thirteen hundred years earlier.   In45
this version of history, England, before the coming of the Normans, was an
“agrarian paradise” whose inhabitants possessed perfect liberty to do as they
chose and where disputes were “settled by established custom and the common
law, which all men understood and revered.”   The major declarations of46
rights in English history, including the Magna Carta, The Petition of Right of
1628,  and the 1689 Bill of Rights,  were not thought to have declared new47 48
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rights, but rather to have reinstated the rights of this earlier period that had
been lost to Norman conquest or the wickedness of rulers.49
This original constitution creation story was, of course, fictional.50
Nevertheless, it was subscribed to by many persons who ought to have known
better from a historical standpoint, including key members of the founding
generation, such as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.   One key reason for51
this was the story’s utility as a political idea: if certain rights were antecedent
to kings and government, those rights did not depend on kings or governments
for their existence and could thus serve as limits on governmental power.52
The actual historical accuracy was beside the point; rather, the purpose of the
tale was to illustrate that rights did not owe their creation to any governmental
power, for what the government could create, it could deny.   Only if the53
constitution preexisted the government could it serve as a standard against
which to test the enactments of the government.54
A second concept that worked its way through English law and to the
colonists was that of “the original contract.”   The original contract was also55
a legal theory that circumscribed the power of the government.   Under this56
theory, the king had contracted with the people, promising to recognize their
rights, not to intrude on those rights, and “to govern according to the laws.”57
Whether there had ever been an actual original contract was uncertain.58
Nevertheless, as with the ancient constitution, the reality was less important
than the utility.  The ancient constitution established rights, and the original
contract bound the government—both the king and Parliament—to respect
them.59
Americans at the time of the revolution assumed that the guarantee of the
original contract extended to them because of the existence of a colonial
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69. See id. at 76-77.  
70. See REID, RULE OF LAW, supra note 62, at 78.  Reid notes that by the late seventeen
contract, either express or implied.   Under the terms of this contract, the60
colonists’ ancestors had pledged to settle the New World in exchange for the
promise that they would continue to be granted the rights of the ancient
constitution and the original contract.61
A concept intertwined with the ancient constitution and original contract
was the “rule of law.”   If the ancient constitution provided the basis for62
rights, then the rule of law gave the rights their vitality.  Under the rule of law,
the individual had the right to be governed by laws that applied to all rather
than by arbitrary government action.   Further, government was to be63
conducted through rules promulgated prior to their application in a particular
case —an idea that would later become part of what American constitutions64
would call “due process.”   The concept of the rule of law, however, was not65
limited to the procedural, at least not prior to the eighteenth century.   Rather,66
the rule of law was also substantive in that it was a constraint on the power of
the king and Parliament to infringe on customary rights.   Under the rule of67
law, the rights that persons received by virtue of the ancient constitution and
custom were superior to those enacted by Parliament.   This is not to say that68
Parliament could not enact laws contrary to customary rights.  If Parliament
did so, however, then the laws were not “laws,” but merely arbitrary
declarations of power.69
By the time of the American Revolution, the concept of the rule of law in
Great Britain had shifted from a substantive notion of due process toward a
notion of parliamentary sovereignty that gave Parliament the ability to make
law and rendered the rule of law procedural.   By contrast, in America, the70
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75. See id.
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Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 860-64 (1978)
(describing the influence of natural law theory at the time of the revolution). 
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78. See Niles, supra note 11, at 109.
concept of the rule of law remained “more historically English than
contemporary British,”  and Americans still believed in a substantive rule of71
law that checked Parliament’s power.72
It is also imperative to understand how the framing generation viewed the
concept of bills of rights.  The purpose of a bill of rights was not to
categorically list all the rights that an individual or body of individuals
possessed, for such rights existed whether listed or not.   Rather, the purpose73
of a bill of rights was to reaffirm rights that had recently come under attack or
were likely to come under attack.   The idea was that the listing of particular74
rights would serve as a reminder and reaffirmation of their existence, though
such existence did not depend on this reaffirmation.75
B. The Influence of Natural Law
Another major influence on the thinking of the framing generation was the
idea of natural law.  The framers, and many other learned persons of the
framing generation, were familiar with natural law theorists such as John
Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, Emerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius, Jean-Jaques
Burlamaqui, and Thomas Rutherforth.   Locke’s ideas regarding natural law76
were particularly influential on Thomas Jefferson when he drafted the
language used in the Declaration of Independence.  When Jefferson wrote that
“all men” had “certain inalienable rights” such as “life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness,”  he was borrowing from Locke’s formulation of the inalienable77
rights of man: life, liberty, and property.   Similarly, when Jefferson stated in78
the Declaration that “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
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83. See Grey, supra note 76, at 860-63.
84. See id.  Pufendorf’s theory of government held that the people could condition their
grant of powers on compliance with a constitution, but that even if they did not, the ruler would
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all of their rights if they chose to do so.  See id. at 862.  Vattel wrote that power could be
delegated to government, but that government could not change the fundamental laws of the
state.  Id. at 862-63.
85. See, e.g., JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
(Boston, Edes & Gill 1764) (drawing on Locke’s Two Treatises to argue that the government’s
power was limited to providing the security of life, liberty, and property), as reprinted in NEIL
H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 227, 228, 232 (1999); THOMAS PAINE, COMMON
SENSE (Phila., R. Bell 1776) (advancing a Lockean idea regarding the formation of
government), as reprinted in COGAN, supra, at 235-45.  
86. Marvin Meyers, Introduction to THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE
of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,”  he was79
referencing another Lockean ideal: where the government acts against the trust
reposed in it, the people have a right to dissolve it and create another.80
Locke was similarly influential on the colonists’ conception of the
formation of governments.  Locke posited a “compact theory” under which
persons surrendered their natural rights—that is, rights that they possessed in
the state of nature—to the community in return for its protection of their lives
and property from others in the community and from outside forces.   The81
people did not surrender all of their rights, however.  Rather, they surrendered
only those rights necessary for the common good, while retaining all others.82
Locke’s compact theory, with alterations, was echoed by other writers,
including Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel.   Each of these writers83
postulated some sort of theory whereby persons formed a government by
agreeing to delegate their own sovereign powers and rights to the government
while retaining those rights that they did not delegate.   The writings of these84
authors, in combination with Locke, provided a framework through which the
colonists could justify their claim to rights and their decision to revolt against
British rule.85
There is no question that Locke and other natural law philosophers were
highly influential on the framers as well.  Locke was the “prime source” for
Madison’s ideas about founding principles.   James Wilson was also heavily86
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88. See id. at 64-65 (discussing statements made by Roger Sherman, Gouverneur Morris,
and Robert Yates, which Gerber characterizes as reflecting natural law principles).  Alexander
Hamilton’s oft-cited remark that the rights of man are “written, as with a sunbeam” also
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note 11, at 108-16 (describing a Lockean natural rights approach).
90. See, e.g., Droddy, supra note 12, at 830-32 (illustrating the reliance of the colonial elite
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92. See REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 87-95 (explaining the use of natural
law rhetoric by the colonists).
93. Id. at 66. 
influenced by natural law theory, a subject that he lectured on as a law
professor at the College of Pennsylvania.   Other framers similarly espoused87
natural rights principles.88
The prevalence of natural rights rhetoric in the Declaration of Independence
and in some of the works of the framers has led many scholars to propose
using natural rights as a foundation for unenumerated rights jurisprudence.
Some of these scholars focus on Lockean philosophy,  while others look to89
the full panoply of natural rights philosophers for evidence of rights.   One90
scholar relies on natural law principles to find “presumption of liberty” in the
Constitution.   In each case, natural law principles or a general theory derived91
from those principles forms the constitutional baseline for determining rights.
For a number of reasons, these scholars overstate the influence of natural
law philosophers such as Locke on the framing generation, particularly when
it comes to the substance of unenumerated rights.  First, although natural rights
were one of the bases on which the American colonists asserted their claim to
rights, this was due in large part to the prevailing practice at the time of
asserting numerous bases for rights to give them a firmer foundation.   As92
historian John Philip Reid notes, the American colonists at the time of the
revolution asserted at least ten bases for the rights they claimed, including
“their rights as Englishmen,” “the original contract,” “the original American
contract,” and “principles from the British Constitution.”93
Second, using Lockean ideals as the sole basis for unenumerated rights
overstates Locke’s influence on the framing generation’s understandings of the
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substance of rights.   There is no doubt that Locke’s theories provided94
significant justification for the rights claimed by the colonists leading up to the
revolution and that, as Mark Niles and others have noted, Locke was second
only to the Bible as a quoted source in American political writings between
1760 and 1775.   This was due in large part to the usefulness of Locke’s95
theories in producing a “clear-cut rationale for independence.”   Locke’s96
influence on the American public, however, did not long survive the
revolution.   As historian Forrest McDonald notes, while Locke’s theories met97
the goals of the revolution, they “did not accord with the desires of the society
of acquisitive individualists that emerged afterward.”   While many of the98
framers continued to espouse Lockean ideals, no new edition of Locke’s Two
Treatises was published in America for more than a century and a half
following the colonial-era edition of 1773.   99
Further, while Locke was a considerable influence on the framers, he was
far from the only natural law philosopher that they consulted regarding
theories of government.  Madison was also influenced by Montesquieu,
especially on the subject of separation of powers,  and by David Hume on the100
subject of the evils of factions.   James Wilson was extremely well versed in101
all of the natural law philosophers and was heavily influenced by Burlamaqui,
Frances Hutcheson, and Rousseau.   As a result, the idea that any one natural102
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law philosopher, even one as influential as Locke, can be made to serve as the
guiding influence for unenumerated rights appears untenable.
What then of the idea, suggested by Droddy and others, that we should use
the collective works of natural law philosophers as evidence of the original
understanding of unenumerated rights?   The problem in doing so is that it103
vastly overstates the degree to which the ordinary person at the time of the
formation of the Constitution was familiar with natural law works, especially
those of the more obscure writers.  To say that James Wilson was intimately
familiar with the works of the natural law theorists of the time is one thing.104
To say that the ordinary person was as familiar with these works as was James
Wilson is quite another.  It is true that many Americans at the time of the
revolution and the framing had some exposure to and familiarity with the
outlines of natural law philosophy, whether through Pufendorf and Locke or
through textbooks distilling their ideas written by Hutcheson or Rutherforth.105
Nevertheless, the extent to which the general public considered these natural
law theories controlling on the content of rights is debatable.
Instead, what most people at the time of the revolution thought of as
“natural law rights” were not those found in the treatises of natural law
philosophers.  Rather, they were the rights “existing ‘under English
government’; that is, [rights] established and recognized under the British
constitution or English law.  What exist[ed] under the British constitution
[was] natural, and it [was] natural because it exist[ed].”106
What is more, although the rhetoric of the colonists at the time of the
revolution included many references to natural law, the specific rights they
claimed were all English rights.   Reid notes that “[t]he fact of the matter is107
that the American whigs did not in any official petition or resolution claim a
natural right that was not already extant in British constitutional theory or
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English common law.”   The problem with using natural law as a basis for108
the content of rights was that natural law philosophers spoke in generalities;
they could provide a basis for claiming rights, but not the substance of those
rights.   Thus, when the colonists actually identified their rights, the rights109
that they identified mirrored English rights.110
 This understanding of natural law rights did not change with independence.
Under the ideas espoused by Locke and other natural law philosophers, once
the colonists had declared that they were free of the British crown, they
reverted to a “state of nature” where they could reconstitute their governments
as they wished.   Indeed, the writings and speeches of leading revolutionaries111
were replete with statements that emphasized this point.   Nonetheless,112
almost immediately upon receiving this opportunity, the colonists drafted new
constitutions and declarations of rights that protected only traditional English
rights,  although they often included grand statements infused with natural113
rights rhetoric.   Further, many constitutions, statutes, and declarations114
explicitly reaffirmed the controlling status of English common law.115
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, most Americans continued
to adhere to an English notion of rights.   While those rights were refined by116
American use of the common law, they still retained their essential English
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heritage, and lawyers and judges often resorted to English common law to
determine what rights meant.117
C. The Framing
It is fair to say that the framers of the Constitution were not chiefly focused
on individual rights during the drafting stages.   Instead, they were focused118
primarily on the task at hand, which was increasing the power of the federal
government.   The federal government created under the Articles of119
Confederation was not powerful enough to threaten rights or to effectively run
the country.   It is unsurprising that rights would get short shrift in such an120
environment.
The framers did, however, protect some rights during the drafting.   The121
rights that they protected share two important characteristics.  First, they were
almost exclusively individual rights.   Second, they were overwhelmingly122
English rights or responses to perceived violations of the rule of law in
England.   123
The majority of the rights protected in the body of the Constitution had a
long pedigree in English law.  For example, the right to trial by jury, which
eventually found its way into Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, was
included in the Magna Carta and was traditionally believed to have been a part
of English law from its beginning.   The privilege of the writ of habeas124
corpus found in Article I, Section 9 was one of the traditional rights of
Englishmen that Parliament identified in the Petition of Right in 1628,  and125
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131. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587-88 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS].  By this time the convention had already received copies of
the proposed Constitution from the Committee of Style.  See LEVY, supra note 121, at 147.
132. 2 RECORDS, supra note 131, at 587.
its use as a tool for inquiring about the cause of a person’s imprisonment
stretches as far back as the fourteenth century.   The prohibitions on bills of126
attainder in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 were a response to the political usage
of such bills in both England and colonial America.   Bills of attainder were127
generally thought to violate the due process of English law, even though they
were within the power of Parliament to enact.   The prohibitions on ex post128
facto laws in the same sections were generally thought to be a principle of
English law (though this principle was not always followed by Parliament),129
and three state constitutions prohibited ex post facto laws at the time of the
framing.130
There was very little thought about actually setting forth a bill of rights in
the Constitution.  The only mention of the possibility of a bill of rights in the
convention record occurred three days before the end of the convention during
the debate regarding whether the right to a jury trial extended to civil cases.131
George Mason of Virginia noted that he “wished the plan had been prefaced
by a Bill of Rights, [and] would second a Motion if made for the purpose.”132
He stated that such a bill would “give great quiet to the people; and with the
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133. Id. at 587-88.
134. Id. at 588.  
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., Governor Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Ratification
Convention (June 9, 1788), reprinted in 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 191 (facsimile reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott
1836) [hereinafter DEBATES].  Randolph argued that a bill of rights would be “quite useless, if
not dangerous to a republic” because bills of rights were designed to limit the prerogative of the
king.  Id.  But Leonard Levy contends that this position was “unpardonable” when compared
to some of Randolph’s previous statements regarding the function or effect of bills of rights.
LEVY, supra note 121, at 157.  James Wilson seems to have chosen to forget that there had ever
been an attempt to include a bill of rights.  See James Wilson, Remarks at the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 2 DEBATES, supra, at 435-36 (“[T]here
was no direct motion offered for any thing [sic] of the kind.”).  Wilson would repeat this
assertion a month later, when he stated that “of so little account was the idea [of a bill of rights]
that it passed off in a short conversation, without introducing a formal debate or assuming the
shape of a motion.”  3 RECORDS, supra note 131, at 143.  
XXOf course, revisionist accounts of the failure to include a bill of rights were not exclusive
to Federalists.  George Mason, who refused to sign the Constitution, made the lack of a bill of
rights the first sentence of his pamphlet entitled “Objections to the Proposed Federal
Constitution.”  See GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 191, 192 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966); RAKOVE,
supra note 43, at 318.  Yet, at the convention, when his objection might have done some good,
he made no real argument for a bill, instead offering only to second a motion for one if made.
aid of the State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.”133
Elbridge Gerry then moved for a committee to prepare a bill of rights;
however, the motion was rejected after a vote.   The only debate on the134
motion occurred when Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated that he was “for
securing the rights of the people where requisite” but noted that “[t]he State
Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force
are sufficient.”   In calling for the vote, however, Mason pointed out that the135
“Laws of the U.S. are to be paramount to State Bills of Rights.”   Possibly136
reluctant to jeopardize the legal efficacy of their respective state bills of rights
in light of this federal supremacy, each of the twelve state delegates present
voted against the motion, and the effort was abandoned.137
Apart from any uncertainty suggested by the momentary exchange between
Sherman and Mason, exactly why the framers chose not to include a bill of
rights at that juncture is unclear.  Many of the framers did attempt to explain
themselves on this score later; however, it is difficult to determine the extent
to which these later statements were sincere as opposed to simply invented
post hoc as a way to rationalize the absence of a bill of rights and to argue that
one was unnecessary.   The most plausible explanation is that the framers138
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See LEVY, supra note 121, at 147.
139. See LEVY, supra note 121, at 149.  The basis for Levy’s argument is a statement in the
notes of the Committee of Detail, attributed to Randolph, that there was no need for philosophic
statements of government in the preamble because the framers were “not working on the natural
rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights, modified by society, and
(supporting) interwoven with what we call (states) the rights of states.”  2 RECORDS, supra note
131, at 137; see also RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 317 (arguing that the framers may have thought
that a bill of rights was not necessary because the federal government was not interfering with
the fundamental rights of the citizens, but only “acquiring from the states and the people the
resources and authority to exercise its essential tasks”).
140. See DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE
CONSTITUTION 225-26 (2007) (noting that by September 12, it was “well beyond late” to
introduce any major changes).
141. See RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 318.  
142. See Richard Henry Lee, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Sept. 27,
1787), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 238-40 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
143. See ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 278-79 (setting forth the political
motives of the Antifederalists). 
144. See id. at 278.
145. See id. at 278-79.
saw a bill of rights as unnecessary at the beginning of the process because they
were not creating a new society, but simply rearranging powers within the
existing society without affecting the fundamental rights of the people.139
Once the Committee of Detail had finished its work and it became apparent
that the relationship between the people and the government would be altered
in significant ways, the framers were simply too far along in the process to risk
having it derailed by arguments over rights.140
D. The Ratification
The framers’ decision not to include a bill of rights would prove to be a
huge problem when the Constitution was sent to the states.  In fact, the lack of
a bill of rights became the main objection to ratification.   Prominent141
opponents of the Constitution immediately objected to the omission of a bill
of rights, arguing that its absence endangered many important rights.   In142
actuality, some of these opponents were not as interested in seeing a bill of
rights added as they were in seeing the Constitution defeated.   For them, the143
lack of a bill of rights was simply an expedient ground on which to attack a
Constitution that they felt gave too much power to the federal government at
the expense of the states.   Nevertheless, many of the Constitution’s144
opponents were sincere in their desire to protect rights, and their arguments
carried great weight in the ratification conventions.145
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146. Id. at 278 (setting out the Federalist arguments).
147. See LEVY, supra note 121, at 156.  Alexander Hamilton made this argument in The
Federalist when he stated, 
[B]ills of rights are in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects,
abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not
surrendered to the prince. . . . It is evident, therefore, that according to their
primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly
founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate
representatives and servants.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 100, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton).  James Wilson also put
forth this contention during the Pennsylvania ratification convention.  See James Wilson,
Remarks in Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 142, at 383 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
148. See LEVY, supra note 121, at 156-57.  This theory was reinforced by the fact that eight
states had adopted bills of rights.  Id.
149. Id. at 153.
150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 100, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton).
151. LEVY, supra note 121, at 153-54.  James Wilson made this argument in addition to the
first argument at the Pennsylvania ratification convention, stating, 
A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers
reserved.  If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is
presumed to be given.  The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would
throw all implied power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the
people would be rendered incomplete.
Wilson, supra note 147, at 436 (Nov. 30, 1787).
The Federalist supporters of the Constitution attempted to counter these
objections by arguing that a bill of rights was unnecessary.   These arguments146
generally took one of two forms.  First, some Federalists argued that, while a
bill of rights might have been necessary in England because it wrested power
from the king, a bill of rights was not appropriate for a republic founded on the
power of the people.   This argument was unpersuasive, however, because the147
“dominant theory” in the United States was that a bill of rights was appropriate
and even necessary in a compact creating a government.148
Second, many Federalists argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary
because the Constitution established a government of limited powers.  In such
a system, any power not delegated to the federal government was reserved to
the states and the people.   Alexander Hamilton conveyed the logic of this149
position in The Federalist when he asked, “Why . . . should it be said, that the
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed?”   Further, according to this argument, the150
enumeration of certain rights in a bill of rights would actually be dangerous
because Americans would presume that only the rights enumerated were
retained, with all others ceded to the national government.151
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152. See Cecelia M. Kenyon, Introduction to THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 138, at xxi,
lxx.
153. See MARK N. GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT:  HISTORY, INTERPRETATION, AND
MEANING 26-28 (1981) (noting that the Federalist position required substantial “mental
gymnastics”).
154. See RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 320.  For an example of a view opposing the Federalist
argument, see Brutus, No. II: To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.J., Nov. 1, 1787, as
reprinted in ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 295-300.
155. See ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 308-10.
156. See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION:  THE EARLIEST DEBATES ON
ORIGINAL INTENT 39 (1999)
157. See id.  Levy notes that these were the only two recommended provisions that actually
belonged in a bill of rights.  LEVY, supra note 121, at 162.  The other recommended
amendments, such as a limit on the power of direct taxation and a provision fixing the number
of representatives at one per thirty thousand people in a state, were really changes to the powers
of Congress.  See Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Mass. Ratification
Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 311-13.
This argument similarly failed to impress the Constitution’s opponents.
They noted that although the Constitution purported to grant only limited
powers to the federal government, it actually contained clauses of expansive
powers, such as the power to act where “necessary and proper.”   Further, the152
convoluted nature of the argument put forth by proponents of the Constitution
worked to convince the Constitution’s critics that some deception was afoot.153
The fact that the Constitution did explicitly protect some rights also served to
convince its opponents that the Federalists’ contentions were not made in good
faith.  154
The resonance that the Antifederalist argument had with the general
population was apparent from the start in the state ratification conventions.
Although Pennsylvania became one of the first states to ratify the Constitution,
a minority of the Pennsylvania convention demanded a comprehensive bill of
rights that would have included provisions protecting liberty in matters of
religion, freedom of speech and press, trial by jury in property cases, and due
process in criminal prosecutions, a prohibition against excessive bail and cruel
and unusual punishments, a requirement that warrants be supported by
evidence, and the right to bear arms.   The demand for a bill of rights was155
even greater in Massachusetts, which provided the ratification process with its
first real test.   Because of strong opposition, the Constitution was only156
ratified with the concession that the ratification include recommended
amendments protecting, inter alia, the right to trial by jury in civil suits and the
right to indictment by a grand jury.   157
Although Maryland ended up ratifying the Constitution as it stood, the
convention attempted to recommend a bill of rights and then to recommend
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158. See Bernard Schwartz, Commentary in 4 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 729-30
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980).
159. Id.
160. See LYNCH, supra note 156, at 39; see also ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF
THE CONSTITUTION 168, 212 (1966) (noting the role of recommended amendments in helping
to pass the Constitution); SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 133-34.
161. See S.C. Ratification Convention, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (May
23, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 158, at 756-57.
162.  See N.H. Ratification Convention, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
(June 21, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 158, at 758-61.
163. See LYNCH, supra note 156, at 41; Schwartz, supra note 158, at 762-63.  Several other
economic and practical factors also played a part in the reluctance of Virginia to ratify.  These
factors included fears that the federal government would allow British creditors to pursue claims
for prewar debts owed by Virginians, the loss of revenue from taxing interstate commerce, and
the loss of legislative influence because of the equality of the Senate.  LYNCH, supra note 156,
at 39-41.  Nevertheless, the controversy over the absence of a bill of rights soon eclipsed these
factors.  See id. at 41.
164. See Schwartz, supra note 158, at 762-63.  
165. Id. at 764.
amendments.   These proposed amendments were eventually published in158
pamphlet form and included provisions for trial by jury in all cases, a
prohibition on double jeopardy, a prohibition on general and oathless warrants,
a prohibition on the quartering of soldiers, a prohibition on the establishment
of religion and a guarantee of religious liberty, and a provision protecting
freedom of the press.159
South Carolina and New Hampshire also ratified with recommended
amendments.   South Carolina recommended four amendments, one of which160
would have recognized that the states retained every power not expressly vested
in the federal government.   New Hampshire’s recommended amendments161
paralleled those recommended by Massachusetts, but New Hampshire also
added bans on troop quartering, laws infringing freedom of religion, and laws
infringing the right to bear arms.162
In Virginia, a fierce ratification fight erupted over the absence of a bill of
rights and the implications of the new powers of the federal government over
the states.   The bill of rights issue was particularly strong in Virginia because163
its state constitution contained a declaration of rights that was enforceable by
the courts through judicial review.164
Virginia eventually ratified the Constitution, but not without compromise.
A motion by Patrick Henry to make ratification contingent on the passage of
amendments was narrowly defeated.   But, in order to secure ratification, the165
supporters of the Constitution were forced to accede to the public sentiment for
a bill of rights by taking steps to make recommendatory amendments after
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166. Id. at 764-65; see also LEVY, supra note 121, at 163.  A motion by Patrick Henry that
a declaration of rights and other recommendations be referred to other states for consideration
prior to ratification was defeated by only eight votes, 88-80.  LYNCH, supra note 156, at 46-47.
167. See Schwartz, supra note 158, at 764-65.
168. Id. at 765.
169. Id. at 765-66.
170. See id. at 852-55.
171. Id. at 854.
172. Id. at 855-56.
173. See Kris E. Palmer, Bill of Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 1789 TO THE
PRESENT 1, 2 (Kris E. Palmer ed., 2000) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS].  
174. See SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 157. 
ratification.   The day after ratification, a drafting committee including166
proponents of the Constitution such as Madison and John Marshall, as well as
opponents of the Constitution such as Henry and George Mason, went to work
on proposed amendments.   Two days after ratification, the committee167
reported a proposed bill of rights containing twenty articles to be added to the
Constitution.   The bill included the right to know the nature and cause of168
accusation, the right to confrontation, the right to present evidence, the right to
a trial by jury in criminal and civil cases, the privilege against self-
incrimination, a prohibition against deprivation of property unless done in
accordance with “the law of the land,” a prohibition against excessive bail or
fines, a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, a prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, the right to freedom of speech and press, the right to bear
arms, a prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, and a right respecting
freedom of religion.169
Once Virginia had ratified, New York followed suit.   In order to win170
ratification, however, the Federalists in New York had to agree to recommend
a bill of rights based on a draft by Antifederalist John Lansing.   This171
recommended bill was quite similar to that recommended by Virginia, except
that it contained, for the first time in a proposed American constitutional
provision, the phrase “due process of Law.”172
The rights recommended by the state ratification conventions lend further
support to the argument that most people at the time of the framing thought of
their rights as English in origin.  Many of the proposed rights that would later
find their way into the Bill of Rights had a long pedigree in English law.   The173
prohibition on quartering troops in the homes of private citizens without
consent, found in the recommended amendments of New Hampshire, Virginia,
and New York, as well as in Maryland’s attempted amendment,  was a staple174
of English common law, and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 provided a
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175. See R.B. Bernstein, Third Amendment, in CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, supra note
173, at 59, 60-61.  Justice Story referred to this amendment as securing “that great right of
common law, that a man’s house shall be his own castle.”  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 709 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833). The
English Bill of Rights of 1689, which gave statutory force to the Declaration of Rights of 1689,
see supra note 48 and accompanying text, asserted the “ancient and indubitable rights and
liberties of the people.”  ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), available at http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/17th_century/england.asp.  It also justified the “Glorious Revolution,” through which King
James II was replaced with William of Orange, and restricted the powers of the monarchy.  See
LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 3-7 (1981) (setting out the
“historians’ view” of the Declaration of Rights and Bill of Rights of 1689).  
176. SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 128, 157.
177. Frederick K. Grittner, Fifth Amendment, in CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, supra note
173, at 91, 93.  According to Grittner, Henry II “issued the assize to take control of the courts
from the Catholic Church and local nobility.”  Id. at 93.  
178. Id. at 94.
179. See id.
180. See Mary Hertz Scarbrough, Sixth Amendment, in CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
supra note 173, at 123, 129.  
181. See SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 197-200. 
182. Id. at 198-200.
183. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 462 (John Bach
McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., Phila., Historical Soc’y Pa. 1888).
184. See MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 32-33 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at
*38-39) (discussing forest laws regarding hunting).
statutory prohibition against troop quartering.   The right to indictment by175
grand jury, recommended by Massachusetts and New Hampshire,  can be176
traced back to Henry II’s enactment of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166.   The177
prohibition against double jeopardy was a concept of English law applied to
capital offenses, albeit in a narrower form.   Its abuse by English royalty178
caused the American colonists to expand it to all crimes.   The prohibition on179
excessive bail recommended by Virginia and the Pennsylvania minority also
descended from English common law and was expressly included in the 1689
Bill of Rights.   Rights such as the right to petition for redress of grievances180
and the right to bear arms were also protected under the 1689 Bill of Rights.181
The prohibition against unlawful seizures of the person and the rights to due
process and trial by jury had their origins in the Magna Carta.182
Even those lesser-known rights discussed at the ratification conventions
reflect an English origin.  The rights championed by the Pennsylvania minority,
the “liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable time . . . [and] to fish in all navigable
waters,” seem curious to us today.   These rights, however, had their genesis183
in English “forest-laws,” under which the king could designate any land within
the kingdom as a “forest” and thereby prevent anyone but himself from hunting
on it.   Federalist supporters such as Noah Webster ridiculed these suggested184
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185. See Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1994).  
186. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 221 (1992) [hereinafter STONER, COMMON
LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY].  The controversy over the failure of the Constitution to include
a bill of rights had quieted down by the time the first Congress met in April of 1789.  See
RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 330-31.  Once ratification had been accomplished and the new
government was in operation, the Antifederalist opposition that had seized upon the idea of a
bill of rights as a means to defeat the Constitution collapsed, and many Federalists believed that
it would be better to let the whole idea simply fade away rather than risk substantive changes
to the constitutional structure.  Id.  Although Madison was of the opinion that “parchment
barriers” such as bills of rights would be ineffective to stop a government from infringing rights
and that the better course would be to restrain powers in the first place, he had become
convinced that a bill of rights would at least “counteract the impulses of interest and passion”
and provide “good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.”  Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 125, at 326-27.  He was also concerned that, if a bill of rights were not introduced,
opponents of the Constitution would say that the Federalists had not kept their promises and call
for a second constitutional convention.  See Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug.
19, 1789), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 491 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987).  In a letter to Richard Peters, Madison stated his belief that the failure to
propose amendments would give “fine texts for popular declaimers who wish to revive the
[antifederalist] cause, and at the fall session of the Legislares. [sic] to blow the trumpet for a
second Convention.”  Id.
187. See STONER, COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 186, at 221.  Madison
mentioned this idea in a letter to Jefferson on December 8, 1788, wherein he stated that
although the Federalists conceded the necessity of amendments, “they wish[ed] the revisal to
be carried no farther than to supply additional guards for liberty, without abridging the sum of
power transferred from the States to the general Government, or altering previous to trial the
particular structure of the latter.”  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 8,
1788), reprinted in ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 329.
188. See Hutson, supra note 118, at 90.
rights as “absolutely trifling” given the state of property laws in the United
States.   Nonetheless, they reflect the quintessential “Englishness” of the rights185
that Americans at the time believed themselves to possess.
The proposed bill of rights Madison that submitted to Congress in 1789
continued this theme.  Madison and other Federalists faced the thorny question
of how to satisfy the public sentiment for a bill of rights and at the same time
prevent wholesale changes to the Constitution that would wreck its essential
structure.   Their solution was to focus on guaranteeing individual rights,186
rather than on suggested amendments that would have altered the Constitution’s
distribution of power between the states and the federal government.187
Operating in accordance with this plan, Madison drew up a list of proposed
amendments, many of which were taken from Virginia’s recommended
amendments.   Madison’s original conception was that the rights would be188
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189. See James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789) [hereinafter
Madison, Amendments Speech], as reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, supra note
186, at 479, 481.  For the full text of Madison’s speech, see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-62 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834). 
190. Madison, Amendments Speech, supra note 189, at 481.  As Randy Barnett notes, this
language is identical to that used in one of the amendments proposed by the Virginia
convention.  Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 39 n.160.
191. See Madison, Amendments Speech, supra note 189, at 481; Hutson, supra note 118,
at 88.
192. Madison, Amendments Speech, supra note 189, at 482.
193. Id.
194. Id.
inserted at what he considered proper places within the Constitution.   At the189
beginning of the Constitution, he would have inserted language explicitly
stating that government exists “for the benefit of the people; which consists in
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property,
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”   The190
precursors to what became eight of the first ten amendments to the Constitution
were to be inserted between Clauses 3 and 4 in Article I, Section 9, the former
prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws and the latter prohibiting
nonproportional direct taxes.191
Madison’s proposed amendments also included a provision prohibiting the
states from violating “the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases,” which would have been inserted in
Article I, Section 10.   Additionally, Madison proposed amendments to Article192
III: one would have guaranteed, inter alia, that all criminal trials (except those
involving impeachment or the military) be heard by an “impartial jury of
freeholders of the vicinage,” and another would have stated that “the trial by
jury [in civil cases] . . . ought to remain inviolate.”   Finally, Madison193
proposed the insertion of an entirely new article in the Constitution that would
have made clear the separation of powers established by the Constitution and
underscored the fact that “[t]he powers not delegated to the federal government
by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States
respectively.”194
Although Madison’s proposed amendments are themselves instructive, his
notes for the speech proposing the amendments provide further insight.  In
those notes, Madison set out what he considered the proper subjects to be
included in a bill of rights: “1. assertion of primitive equality [etc.]  2. do. of
rights exerted in formg. of Govts.  3. natural rights. [sic] retained as speach
[sic].  4. positive rights resultg. as trial by jury.  5. Doctrinl. artics vs. Depts.
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195. James Madison, Notes for Amendments Speech in the First Congress (June 8, 1789)
[hereinafter Madison, Notes], reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1042 (1971).
196. See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 39 n.160.  
197. See LOCKE, supra note 80, at 56, 83.  Virginia’s proposed amendment made the
connection with natural law even more explicit, referring to the “certain natural rights of which
men, when they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity.”  See Barnett,
Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 39 n.160 (quoting Va. Ratification Convention, Proposed
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (June 27, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 636, 636 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)).
198. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).  Montesquieu theorized that “when legislative power is
united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of magistracy, there is no
liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will
execute them tyrannically.”  Id.
199. See Madison, Amendments Speech, supra note 189, at 481.
200. See Madison, Notes, supra note 195, at 1042; Madison, Amendments Speech, supra
note 189, at 482 (recognizing a distinction between natural rights and positive rights). 
201. See SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 197-200 (noting the English origins
of the right to petition for redress of grievances and the right to bear arms).  Although Schwartz
argues that the other rights contained in what became eight of the first ten amendments were
American in origin, his argument understates the extent to which they were influenced by
English precursors.  See supra text accompanying notes 173-85. 
Distinct electn. [and]  6. moral precepts for the administrn. & natl. character -
as justice - economy - [etc.].”195
Both these notes and the proposed amendments provide an interesting
window on Madison’s thinking and reflect a mixture of common law and
natural law.  For example, the natural rights language of Madison’s proposed
preamble, which was taken almost entirely from one of Virginia’s proposed
amendments,  clearly reflects John Locke’s formulation of inalienable rights196
and Locke’s determination that where a government does not properly protect
those rights, the people may reform or change it.   Similarly, Madison’s197
proposal regarding separation of powers reflects the thought of a natural law
theorist—Montesquieu.   But the proposal listing the rights that eventually198
came to comprise eight of the first ten amendments reflects more pragmatic
concerns.   Madison’s notes classify the rights in this proposal as either199
“natural rights retained” or “positive rights result[in]g” from and necessary for
the protection of the retained rights.   Yet, while Madison called the retained200
rights “natural,” they were actually all personal rights either borrowed directly
from traditional English law or modified in response to perceived abuses of the
law by the Crown and Parliament.201
Madison also attempted to address the fear that the enumeration of specific
rights might cause other fundamental rights to be disregarded.  The very last
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202. Madison, Amendments Speech, supra note 189, at 482. 
203. Id. at 483.
204. See SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 173-74.  These issues were resolved
by attaching the amendments to the Constitution as addenda rather than incorporating them with
existing provisions.  See id. at 174.
provision in Madison’s proposed bill of rights was a precursor to the Ninth
Amendment.  The provision read,
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge
the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.202
Madison explained the genesis of this language and the reason for including it
in his proposal when responding to one of the most prominent challenges to a
bill of rights:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration,
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
general government, and were consequently insecure.  This is one
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that
may be guarded against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see
by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.203
Thus, Madison made clear that the listing of certain rights in a new bill of rights
would not preclude the existence of others not specifically enumerated.
The debates in Congress also reinforce the connection of the Bill of Rights
to English common law and constitutional practice.  Although much of the
debate centered on the form and placement of the various amendments,  some204
of the debate provides insight into what the members of Congress thought at the
time about the nature of rights, and, as important, how much disagreement
existed over them. 
That the Bill of Rights was simply a declaration of preexisting rights and did
not itself confer rights appears to have been beyond dispute.  Roger Sherman,
in a House of Representatives debate in August 1789, argued for the placement
of the Bill of Rights at the end of the Constitution, maintaining that this would
not hinder the understanding of the document because “[t]he amendments
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205. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 742 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
206. Id. at 759.
207. Id. at 759-60.
208. Id. at 760.
209. Id.  Page’s statement that “a man has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared
before the face of authority” was a reference to the trial of William Penn in 1670, during which
Penn had been held in contempt and fined for failing to remove his hat in court.  SCHWARTZ,
GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 175. 
reported are a declaration of rights; the people are secure in them, whether we
declare them or not.”205
The exact scope of these preexisting rights and their potential for
abridgment, however, engendered many disagreements.  In a House debate over
what would later become the First Amendment, Representative Theodore
Sedgwick of Massachusetts took issue with the language guaranteeing the
freedom to assemble, not because he disagreed with the right, but because he
thought that enumerating the right was unnecessary.  “If people freely converse
together,” he reasoned, “they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-
evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that
never would be called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House
to descend to such minutiae.”   When Representative Benson reminded him206
that the committee had assumed that the rights were inherent and had simply
sought to protect against their infringement, Sedgwick retorted that, under that
principle, the committee “might have declared that a man should have a right
to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to
bed when he thought proper.”   In Sedgwick’s view, such a lengthy207
enumeration of rights was unnecessary “in a Government where none of them
were intended to be infringed.”   Other representatives disagreed, however.208
Most notably, in response to Sedgwick’s suggestion that the right to assemble
was no more important than the right to wear a hat, John Page of Virginia
stated, 
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a
man has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before
the face of authority; people have also been prevented from
assembling together on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to
guard against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege
in the declaration of rights.  If the people could be deprived of the
power of assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be
deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause.209
Other discussions about the amendments highlight the effect of customary
English practice and abuses on the representatives’ understanding of rights.
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210. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778.
211. See id. at 781. 
212. Compare H. SELECT COMM., 1ST CONG., REPORT ON AMENDMENTS (July 28, 1789),
reprinted in ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 345, with Madison, Amendments
Speech, supra note 189, at 481-82.  This dramatic revision completely excised Madison’s
preamble reflecting the language of the Declaration of Independence, including the right to
dissolve the government.  See ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 344 (noting that
Madison “was ultimately unsuccessful” in altering “the Preamble of the Constitution to
incorporate, expressly, the principles of the Declaration of Independence”).
213. Compare MONTESQUIEU, supra note 198, at 157, with Madison, Amendments Speech,
supra note 189, at 482; see also SCHWARTZ, GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 183.  In the
course of reducing the House’s seventeen amendments to twelve, the Senate combined some
amendments and deleted the provisions preventing states from infringing on freedom of
conscience, speech, press, and the right to a jury trial.  Id. at 182.  Unfortunately, because the
Senate held debate behind closed doors (and continued to do so until 1794), there is no record
of the reasons for these changes.  Id. at 181.  Of the twelve amendments recommended, ten were
eventually ratified by the states.  Id. at 186.  With regard to the first two amendments, dealing
with apportionment of representatives and compensation for senators and representatives, five
states either rejected these outright or delayed ratification long enough to assure their demise,
though the reasons for such direct or indirect rejection are unclear.  Id. at 184, 187.  As
Schwartz notes, there is surprisingly little on record about the debates over the Bill of Rights
in the states.  See id. at 187.
Representative Elbridge Gerry cited Great Britain’s attempt to prevent the
formation of a militia in Massachusetts prior to the revolution to explain his
skepticism toward allowing conscientious objector language in a provision that
would become the Second Amendment.   Similarly, other representatives210
invoked British custom in the debate over the quartering of soldiers in private
homes.211
Another interesting development in the House concerned the fate of
Madison’s grand natural law language.  In the course of debate, all of this
language was stripped away.   The Senate was similarly inhospitable to212
Madison’s use of natural law concepts.  Among other changes, the Senate
deleted Madison’s Montesquieu-inspired language relating to separation of
powers.213
The history of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights confirms the particular “Englishness” of the rights that most Americans
thought they possessed.  The rights that were adopted in both the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights were personal rights that had their genesis in either
English tradition or in American refinement of English practice.  The Bill of
Rights emerged from the state legislatures stripped of its natural law flourishes,
instead enshrining the most important rights handed down from the English
Constitution.
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214. See HASTINGS LYON & HERMAN BLOCK, EDWARD COKE:  ORACLE OF THE LAW 346
(1929) (noting that Coke’s First Institute served as the “lawyer’s primer” for nearly one hundred
and fifty years, until the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries); Edward S. Corwin, The
“Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 366
(1929) [hereinafter Corwin (pt. 2)] (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s characterization of the First
Institute as “the universal lawbook of students” in the pre-revolutionary period).  The Puritans
of Massachusetts had ordered copies of Coke’s Institutes as early as 1647.  DANIEL R.
COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 370 (2d ed. 2004).
215. See LYON & BLOCK, supra note 214, at 345-46.
216. Id. at 343, 345.
217. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), reprinted in 10
WRITINGS, supra note 80, at 376 (1899); see also Corwin (pt. 2), supra note 214, at 365, 366.
The role that traditional English rights played in the formation of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights should inform our understanding of the
rights that were not included but that were in fact “retained” by the people.
Rather than being based on abstract natural law concepts, they were traditional
rights located within the English constitutional heritage and the common law.
III. Whose Common Law?
If most Americans during the framing period viewed their rights as based on
traditional English law, then the question becomes, where did they get their
conception of what the common law was?  For most Americans, their idea of
the common law came from two sources: Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes of the
Laws of England, the first volume of which was published in 1628, and Sir
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, the first edition
of which was published in four volumes between 1765 and 1769.  
Most lawyers in the United States at the time of the revolution had studied
Coke, and the principles laid down in his Institutes informed their view of
rights.   In the First Institute, which was alternatively titled, A Commentary214
on Littleton, Coke wrote to summarize and update Sir Thomas de Littleton’s
fifteenth-century treatise entitled Tenures, which had long been a staple of the
English legal curriculum, serving as the first textbook that law students were
expected to study.   Although Littleton had dealt mostly with property law,215
Coke took Littleton’s work as a point of departure for discussion of the
common law generally.   Thomas Jefferson noted, with regard to Coke on216
Littleton, that “a sounder Whig never wrote, nor of profounder learning in the
orthodox doctrines of the British Constitution, or in what was called British
liberties.”   Coke followed his work on Littleton with his Second Institute, a217
commentary and gloss on the Magna Carta and other famous statutes; his Third
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218. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 317.
219. See Harold Gill Reuschlein, The Ante-“Taught Law” Period in the United States, 32
VA. L. REV. 955, 956 (1946).  Reuschlein adhered to Roscoe Pound’s characterization of the
common law of the colonies as “Coke’s common law.”  Id. at 956 n.7 (quoting Roscoe Pound,
The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 AM. L. REV. 676, 679 (1914)).
“English case law and English legislation prior to Coke,” Pound explained, “were summed up
for us and handed down to us by that indefatigable scholar in what we have chosen to consider
an authoritative form; and we have looked at them through his spectacles ever since.”  See
Pound, supra, at 679-80.
220. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 317 n.18.  To view a revolutionary-era printing
of the First Institute, see EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE, OR HIS COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON (Francis Hargrave ed., 13th ed., London, G. Kearsly & G. Robinson 1774),
available at www.constitution.org/18th/coke1st1778/coke1st1778_001-050.pdf.
221. See Corwin (pt. 2), supra note 214, at 365, 366.  Corwin characterizes Coke’s method
as “irritatingly fragmentary, with the result that his larger ideas have often to be dug out and
pieced together from a heterogeneous mass.”  Id.
222. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Dec. 25, 1762), reprinted in 1 GEORGE
TUCKER, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 26 (London, Charles Knight & Co. 1837).
223. See Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic:  A Study
of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 744 (1976).
224. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 362 (4th ed.,
Butterworth & Co., Ltd. 1948) (1929). 
225. See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 n.35
Institute, which dealt with criminal law; and his Fourth Institute, which dealt
with court jurisdiction.218
Collectively, Coke’s Institutes served as one of the chief sources for the
American lawyer’s view of the common law and rights during the revolutionary
period.   They were not readily accessible to the general population, however.219
The text of the First Institute, for example, appeared as marginal commentary
alongside the text of Littleton’s Tenures, which in turn appeared on the page in
both Latin and English.   And if the formatting presented a challenge to220
Coke’s readers, the writing was at least as difficult to understand.   Thomas221
Jefferson, who would later speak of Coke in glowing terms, said as a law
student, “I do wish the Devil had old Coke, for I am sure I never was so tired
of an old dull scoundrel in my life.”222
By the time of the revolution, the popular view of the law in the United
States had shifted, and Blackstone had largely replaced Coke as the source for
information regarding the common law of England.   Rather than providing223
a gloss on previous sources of law or statutes like Coke’s Institutes,
Blackstone’s Commentaries marked “the first comprehensive attempt to state
the whole of English law in the form of substantive rules.”   It imposed a224
structure that classified and compiled the common law into a more usable form
than that of earlier works, which reflected the “ad hoc” growth of English
common law.   This systematic approach gave rise to “[t]he most important225
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(1996).
226. COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 438.
227. Alschuler, supra note 225, at 5; see also COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 371.
228. COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 371, 438; Alschuler, supra note 225, at 5.  Bell noted
that the reason for the pirated edition was to “produce mental improvement, and commercial
expansion, with the additional recommendation of possitively [sic] saving thousands of pounds
to and among the inhabitants of the British empire in America.”  Robert Bell, Subscription
Notice (1771), reprinted in COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 421.
229. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 214, at 371; DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE 171 (1938).  In 1771, James Iredell, who later became one of the first Justices of
the Supreme Court, wrote his father in London asking him to procure a copy.  William D.
Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 7 (1994).
230. EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH ON CONCILIATION WITH AMERICA (Hammond Lamont ed.,
Boston, Ginn & Co. 1897) (1775).
231. LOCKMILLER, supra note 229, at 170; see also Bader, supra note 229, at 6-11
(describing the influence of Blackstone on early American law in the colonies).
232. Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the
Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 479 (2005).
233. See Nolan, supra note 223, at 744 (noting that, while claims that Blackstone’s
Commentaries provided the principal inspiration for the Constitution are overblown, the
feature of Blackstone’s Commentaries[, namely,] that it could be read and
understood by intelligent laymen.”226
The reaction to Blackstone’s Commentaries in America was immediate.  The
first four-volume English edition was published between 1765 and 1771, and
more than one thousand copies of this first edition were sold in the American
colonies.   Robert Bell published a pirated edition in America between 1771227
and 1772, adding another fourteen hundred copies to the mix.   Among the228
first to obtain copies of Blackstone during this period (pirated or otherwise)
were revolutionaries and founders such as James Otis, John Adams, James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton, as well as Thomas
Marshall, who subscribed to the American edition for his eldest son (and future
Chief Justice), John Marshall.   In 1775, member of the House of Commons229
Edmund Burke, in urging conciliation with the American colonies, stated that
“[i]n no country perhaps in the world is the law so general a study [as in the
colonies]. . . . I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone’s
Commentaries in America as in England.”   By that time, Blackstone’s230
Commentaries had become “the chief if not the only law books in every
[colonial] lawyer’s office, and the most important if not the only textbooks for
[colonial] law students.”   Further, because the language of Blackstone was231
written for the layman, it was “approachable for the colonists with limited legal
skills but a great thirst to learn of their legal rights.”232
The Commentaries became even more entrenched in America in the time
between independence and the framing of the Constitution.   As Blackstone’s233
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/1
2010] BLACKSTONE’S NINTH AMENDMENT 203
“Commentaries’ position as an authority on the common law was more firmly established in
1787 than in 1776”).
234. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3-4 (1941)
(explaining that, in the first century after independence, Blackstone’s Commentaries
“constituted all there was of the law” for most lawyers).
235. Alschuler, supra note 225, at 9, 15.  For example, Blackstone voted in favor of
renewing the Stamp Act and generally positioned himself against recognition of robust rights
for colonists.  See id. at 15.
236. Id. at 9.  In his original version of the Commentaries, Blackstone stated that the
common law did not run to “conquered or ceded countries” and described the American
colonies as such.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *108.
237. See Alschuler, supra note 225, at 9.
238. See REID, RULE OF LAW, supra note 62, at 77-79 (describing the American Revolution
as a battle between the recently ascendant British ideal of parliamentary sovereignty and the
American view of the supremacy of the rule of law, which arguably hearkened back more
deeply into English constitutionalism).
239. See Jefferson, supra note 217, at 376; Alschuler, supra note 225, at 10 n.49.  For more
criticisms of Blackstone by Jefferson, see Julian S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV. 629, 634-46 (1933).  Jefferson also criticized the
Commentaries itself, stating that it was only a digest of what students might acquire from “the
real fountains of the law.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (May 26, 1810),
reprinted in 9 WRITINGS, supra note 80, at 276-77 n.1 (1898).
240. See Waterman, supra note 239, at 650-51.
Commentaries became the chief source of legal education, it simultaneously
supplied the language of the common law.234
This is not to say, of course, that the Commentaries went without criticism,
or that all of the framers were unhesitatingly enthusiastic about Blackstone
himself.  As a member of Parliament, Blackstone was unsympathetic to
American colonists’ claims.   He was an apologist for the Crown and235
Parliament, and he maintained that the colonists were not entitled to the
“common law rights of British subjects.”   Further, Blackstone was a236
proponent of parliamentary supremacy,  a doctrine that, although triumphant237
in Great Britain, was repugnant to Americans.   Thomas Jefferson accused238
Blackstone of being a disciple of Lord Mansfield—one of the principal
engineers of British colonial policy—and later in life decried the extent to
which “the honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone” had replaced Coke on Littleton
as the primary teaching tool for law students, causing the legal profession to
“slide into toryism.”   James Wilson criticized Blackstone’s assertion of239
parliamentary supremacy and argued that Blackstone had failed to properly
recognize that rights were natural in origin rather than created by government.240
St. George Tucker attempted to limit Blackstone’s influence on American law
students by identifying ways in which Blackstone’s Commentaries was not
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241. Craig Evan Klafter, The Americanization of Blackstone’s Commentaries, in ESSAYS ON
ENGLISH LAW AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 42, 52-60 (Elisabeth A. Cawthon & David E.
Narrett eds., 1994).
242. See Meyler, supra note 21, at 562.
243. See id. 
244. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *41, *161.
245. Id. at *162.
246. See Joseph W. McKnight, Blackstone, Quasi-Jurisprudent, 13 SW. L.J. 399, 402 (1959)
(discussing problems with Blackstone’s theory of the law.)
247. PLUCKNETT, supra note 224, at 271, quoted in Waterman, supra note 239, at 631.
248. See McKnight, supra note 246, at 401 (attributing Blackstone’s influence to the fact
that the Commentaries “was the only general treatise available in a land where well-trained
lawyers were almost non-existent”); Waterman, supra note 239, at 631 & nn.14-16 (collecting
and quoting sources).  St. George Tucker was concerned with Blackstone’s influence on the
Virginia bar even though Virginia, because of the efforts of Thomas Jefferson, had succeeded
in passing many law reforms contrary to Blackstone’s version of the common law.  Klafter,
supra note 241, at 52.  He feared that most lawyers and judges might continue to rely on the
Commentaries because they did not have access to the revised laws.  Id.
249. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 111
(1921), quoted in Waterman, supra note 239, at 631.  
suited to American law, an endeavor which led him to publish a
“republicanized” version of the Commentaries in 1803.241
Furthermore, the Commentaries was not an entirely accurate representation
of the state of British common law at the time it was published.   Blackstone’s242
Commentaries was published at a time when the British legal system was in
flux, with the common law itself giving way to parliamentary authority.   The243
Commentaries straddled both sides of this conflict, with Blackstone stating at
once that “no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to [the law of nature]”
and that “[parliament] can, in short, do every thing [sic] that is not naturally
impossible.”   Blackstone concluded, “So long therefore as the English244
constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is
absolute and without control.”   As a result of Blackstone’s attempt to gloss245
over the changing nature of the common law, the legal theory in the
Commentaries is often “contradictory, muddled, and disorderly.”246
Despite these criticisms, however, the Commentaries formed “the principal
means of . . . information as to the state of English law in general” for the
average American citizen at the time of the framing.   The Commentaries247
stood in for the body of the common law and became the principal source of
law for many courts that did not have access to other materials.   For law248
students and courts alike, “[t]he easiest course to pursue was to follow
[Blackstone] in all cases where constitutions or legislatures had not spoken.”249
This reliance on Blackstone as an authority for English law extended even to
those who had many other sources available.  Specifically, the Commentaries
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250. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 131, at 448-49 (attributing an invocation of the
Commentaries during drafting discussions to John Dickinson, a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention of 1787); see also C. ELLIS STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 48 (New York, MacMillan 1894) (noting the influence of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, “the highest authority on the laws of England,” on the Constitutional
Convention’s plan for a three-part system of government). 
251. See Nolan, supra note 223, at 744-46 (discussing some of the references to Blackstone
in the state ratifying conventions).  Nolan is careful to note that the references were directed
toward the state of the common law as it actually stood rather than as it should be.  Id. at 744-
45.
252. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *38-44.
253. See id. at *39-40.
254. Id. at *42.
255. Id.
256. See id. at *42-43.  Of murder, Blackstone stated that
this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and
from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime.  Those human
laws that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase it’s [sic] moral guilt, or
became the reference source for English common law among some of the
framers, who resorted to it to determine the state of the law in England
regarding, among other things, whether the term “ex post facto” applied to civil
as well as criminal cases.   The use of Blackstone as a sourcebook on the250
common law continued during the ratification debates.251
Because Blackstone’s Commentaries shaped the common perception of the
law in America at the time of the framing, it should inform our understanding
of the original common meaning of unenumerated rights.  If, as I have
suggested, what really matters regarding the Bill of Rights is what the people
who enacted it thought their “other” rights to be, then it is imperative to look at
what source gave the public its ideas of rights.  At the time of the framing, those
“other” rights were the rights that the people thought they possessed at common
law, and their ideas about the common law came from Blackstone.  If what we
are searching for is the original common meaning of unenumerated rights, then
Blackstone is the place to start.
In order to understand the view of rights in Blackstone’s Commentaries, it
is necessary to understand Blackstone’s ideas of the nature of the law in
general.  According to Blackstone, there are four types of law.   The first is the252
law of nature, by which Blackstone meant not so much natural law as
envisioned by philosophers, but rather the “eternal, immutable laws of good and
evil,” which are binding on all persons.   The second type of law is revealed253
law, found in the holy scriptures.   Blackstone considered these two types of254
law to be superior to human law and not dependent on it for their force.255
Included in these types of laws are laws proscribing what Blackstone
considered “moral wrongs,” such as murder.   A third type of law is that of256
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superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae to abstain from it’s [sic]
perpetration.
Id.
257. Id. at *43.
258. Id. at *42; see also id. at *44-46 (positing a cumulative definition of “municipal law”).
259. Id. at *44.  Blackstone explained that 
a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him
of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation
of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in
general; it is rather a sentence than a law.  But an act to declare that the crime of
which Titius is accused shall be deemed high treason; this has permanency,
uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule.
Id.
260. Id. at *45.  
261. See id.
262. Id. at *45-46.
263. See id. at *46 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at *162 (“So long . . . as the English
constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and
without control.”).  
264. Id. at *123.
265. Id.
266. Id. at *124.
nations, which is governed only by the law of nature and certain compacts and
agreements.257
Blackstone’s fourth type of law is the municipal law, which covers those
matters “in which the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty;
but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within
certain limits.”   Liberty may be restrained in certain instances by municipal258
law, but municipal laws must have certain qualities.  First, they must consist of
“rules”; that is, they must be “permanent, uniform, and universal” rather than
aimed at a particular person.   They also must prescribe rules of civil conduct259
as opposed to simply moral conduct.   This does not necessarily mean that the260
legislature cannot legislate on moral conduct, but the conduct must have a civil
component or benefit.   Additionally, municipal laws must be prescribed, that261
is, published in some manner, and cannot be ex post facto.   Finally, the laws262
must be made by “the supreme power in a state,” by which Blackstone meant
Parliament.263
According to Blackstone, personal rights are either absolute or relative.264
Absolute rights are not “absolute” in the sense that they cannot be taken away;
rather, they are those rights that belong to every man, either in or out of
society.   By contrast, relative rights are those that result from the formation265
of society;  that is, they arise from relationships in society and include the266
rights of Parliament, the king, the magistrates, the people, the clergy, the civil
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267. See id. at *125.  Blackstone devoted at least one chapter of the first volume of the
Commentaries to each of the categories listed above.  See generally 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
126.
268. Id. at *124-25.
269. Id. at *129.  This iteration of common law rights left such an impression on the
American legal mind that James Kent and Joseph Story used it verbatim in their treatises on
American constitutional law.  See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (New
York, O. Halsted 1827) (“The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of
personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.”);
STORY, supra note 175, at 709 (noting that the Fourth Amendment “seems indispensable to the
full enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property”). 
270. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *129.
271. See id. at *134 (stating that the rights of security of body, health, and reputation are “of
much less importance than those which have gone before”).  This is not to diminish the value
of the other aspects of personal security.  With respect to security of personal reputation in
particular, Blackstone remarked that without it, “it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment
of any other advantage or right.”  Id.
272. Id. at *129-30.
273. See id. at *131.
274. Id. at *134.
275. See id. at *134-35.
state, the military, master and servant, husband and wife, parent and child,
guardian and ward, and corporations.   Blackstone stated that the principal aim267
of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of absolute rights, while the
secondary aim is to protect people in the enjoyment of those rights that are
relative.268
Blackstone divided the absolute rights of individuals into three categories:
(1) the right of personal security, (2) the right of personal liberty, and (3) the
right of private property.   The right of personal security includes the rights to269
enjoy life, limbs, body, health, and reputation.   Of these rights, the rights to270
enjoy life and limbs are the most important.   These rights belong to each271
person at the quickening in the womb and include the right to self-defense and
the right to void contracts completed under duress.   Blackstone also seems to272
have suggested that there is a right—which he thought adequately protected by
the “poor statutes” in England—to demand from society the minimal necessities
of life.273
Blackstone defined the right to personal liberty as the “power of . . .
changing situation or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course
of law.”   Blackstone thought this right to be free from arbitrary imprisonment274
or other confinement well protected by the right to trial, the right to legal
indictment, and the right of habeas corpus.   The right to personal liberty also275
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276. Id. at *136-37.
277. Id. at *138.
278. See id. at *139-40.
279. Id. at *141.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *143.
284. Id. at *143-44.
285. See id. at *124, *138.
286. See id. at *124; see also MOTT, supra note 65, at 4-5 (establishing the connection
between due process and the “law of land” clause from the Magna Carta).
287. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *124-26.
288. See id. at *126.  By contrast, a law that restrains conduct for any purpose not directed
includes the right to void any contract made under duress of confinement and
the right not to be exiled from one’s own country.276
The third absolute right is the right of property, which encompasses “the free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all . . . acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”   This right protects the person277
from having property taken arbitrarily, from having property taken for public
use without just compensation, and from taxation without consent or
representation.278
In addition to these absolute rights, there are other “subordinate” rights
whose purpose is “to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary
rights.”   The first of these is the “constitution, powers, and privileges of279
parliament,” which literally means that the manner in which Parliament is
elected and the power given to Parliament serve to help protect rights.   The280
second, as a corollary to the first, is the limitation of the power of the king.281
The third is the right of each English subject to apply to the courts for speedy
redress of injuries.   Fourth, each person has the right, in certain282
circumstances, to appeal to the king and Parliament for redress.   Finally, all283
persons have the right to “hav[e] arms for their defence [sic], suitable to their
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.”284
Unlike the rights discussed previously, these rights are not absolute in all
applications.  Rather, they are bound by “the laws of the land,” that is, by the
valid laws enacted to protect and regulate society.   Not all laws are valid285
laws.  Instead, only those laws that comport with “the law of the
land,”—meaning due process, both procedural and substantive—are valid.286
Thus, in order to be valid, laws must be reasonable rather than arbitrary.287
According to Blackstone, a law is reasonable if it advances the public good, for
then it increases rather than restrains liberty by benefitting the civil society that
protects liberty.   Reasonableness is not the only test of a law’s validity,288
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toward a public good is destructive of liberty.  Id.  Blackstone cited as an example of such a law
the statute of Edward IV prohibiting persons below the rank of lord from wearing pikes of more
than two inches in length because this prohibition served no public purpose.  Id.  In contrast,
he cited the prescription of Charles II that all persons were to be buried in woolen garments as
an example of a reasonable law because it advanced the governmental objective of benefitting
the wool trade.  Id.  Although this may seem to be a low threshold for public benefit, the wool
trade was of vital economic importance to Great Britain, and the degree to which its protection
was a matter of public interest should not be understated.  See W. J. ASHLEY, THE EARLY
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH WOOLLEN INDUSTRY 13 (Baltimore, Guggenheimer, Weil & Co.
1887), available at http://www.archive.org/details/earlyhistoryofen00ashlrich.  Ashley noted
that the wool trade was referred to as the source of England’s wealth and constituted two-thirds
of its exports by the end of the seventeenth century.  Id.
289. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *125.
290. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Tradition & Constitutionalism Before the
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 193-97 (explaining the close conceptual relationship
between “rights” and “custom and tradition” for revolutionary-era colonists).  McConnell
advocates an approach to constitutional interpretation that “presupposes an established set of
fundamental rights not created by the Constitution but protected or preserved by it.”  Id. at 197.
291. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *133-34 (describing the right to personal
liberty as subject to infringement only by “due course of law” and the right to life as subject to
infringement under English law only by “the law of the land” or “due process of law”). 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 243-46.
293. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *91 (“[I]f the parliament will positively enact
a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the
however.  The absolute rights of an individual may be restrained only “so
far . . . (and no farther) as is necessary” for the needs of civil society.   The289
idea is to find the correct balance between the liberty of the individual and the
needs of society, and the key to this determination is custom and tradition.290
Thus, there are traditional and customary limitations on what government can
do.  These limitations are the rights retained by the people.
Blackstone’s formulation of rights implies a hierarchy, with absolute rights
occupying a higher plane than relative rights and subordinate rights
guaranteeing the absolute rights.  Yet, as the foregoing discussion suggests,
even absolute rights may be infringed, provided that the infringement accords
with due process.   On the definition of such “due process,” however, the291
flesh-and-blood Blackstone of England and the Blackstone understood by
Americans diverged, although not as much as might be thought.  As noted
above, Blackstone’s Commentaries straddles the line between the old English
notion of due process and the rule of law and the new British notion of
parliamentary sovereignty, between what was and what would be.292
Blackstone’s Commentaries is firmly on the side of parliamentary sovereignty,
but there are echoes of the old common law notion of due process as well.
Blackstone would never have admitted that Parliament could not pass any law
it wanted, for he viewed Parliament as sovereign.   Nevertheless, he was293
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constitution, that is vested with authority to control it.”).
294. See id. at *133 (positing that laws directing the death penalty “for light and trivial
causes” are tyrannical, although to a lesser degree than the taking of life by a government
without laws at all).
295. See REID, RULE OF LAW, supra note 62, at 77-79.  
296. See MOTT, supra note 65, at 142.
297. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 223, at 742 (noting how Alexander Hamilton used
Blackstone’s ideas regarding the “absolute rights of individuals to buttress his legal arguments
against Parliament”).
298. Cf., e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 251-59 (1990) (criticizing
constitutional interpretation of rights not based on original understanding); Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 16-18 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (setting out a historical textualist view of the Constitution that would freeze
rights at the time of the framing). 
299.  See POCOCK, supra note 49, at 30-31, 36; REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note
45, at 69; Meyler, supra note 21, at 593-600; see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
300. See REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 69-70.
301. See id. (discussing the purpose of bills of rights at the time of the revolution). 
forced to admit that some things, if done by Parliament, would be arbitrary or
tyrannical.294
By contrast, the idea of parliamentary sovereignty was rejected in America;
instead, due process retained substantive meaning rather than signaling simply
procedural concerns.   In America, the term “due process of law” embodied295
the common law and its general rights and privileges, and due process could be
asserted against the legislature and executive alike.   While Americans of the296
framing era accepted Blackstone’s exposition of the substance of the common
law and rights, they did not rely on his theories regarding the power of
Parliament.297
Using English constitutional and common law, especially as expressed in
Blackstone’s Commentaries, as the chief source of the common understanding
of rights at the time of the framing leads to several important conclusions
regarding unenumerated rights.  First, recognizing this basis for rights should
put to rest the idea that enforceable constitutional rights can somehow be
limited to those listed in the Bill of Rights or to discrete lists set forth at various
times by certain revolutionaries or framers.   If the existence of the Ninth298
Amendment were not alone enough to contradict this idea, a historical analysis
of the English common law method and the English Constitution should.299
Bills of rights were simply not thought of as ways to enumerate all of the rights
that persons possessed.   Rather, their purpose was to reaffirm those rights that300
had most recently been under attack or that were considered most likely to be
infringed by the government.   This is not to say that the enumeration of rights301
was of no consequence; it could serve as a way to highlight the special
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302. See Madison, Amendments Speech, supra note 189, at 483.  In his speech to the House
of Representatives, Madison noted his hope that the enumeration of certain important rights
would prompt “independent tribunals of justice . . . [to] consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights.”  Id. at 484.  
303. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.  
304. See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
305. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 10.
306. See id. at 10-11.
307. See id.
308. See id.  Reid quotes one reviewer for The Scots Magazine as saying,
It perhaps would be dangerous . . . to inquire too curiously into the strict and
punctual legality of all the powers exercised by government, and all the privileges
claimed by the subject. . . . There are mysteries in politics, as well as in religion,
which a good politician, and a good Christian, should endeavour to believe,
without attempting even to understand.
Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309. See id. at 25.  Reid identifies the British “discovery” of the right against general search
warrants in the early 1760s as an example, noting that “[t]hey did not, of course, discover the
right.  What they discovered was that it could be abused in ways previously not suspected or not
understood.”  Id.
importance of certain rights.   Enumeration, however, was not the determinant302
of a right’s existence.   303
For the same reason, various lists of rights put forth by revolutionaries such
as James Otis or framers such as James Wilson cannot be regarded as
conclusive lists of rights.  They were not attempts to enumerate all of the rights
that Americans possessed, but were instead aimed at claiming certain rights that
were in danger.   As a result, though the presence of such rights on these lists304
is persuasive evidence that they were regarded as existing rights, the absence
of certain rights is not proof of the reverse.
Recognizing English common law and constitutional law as the basis for
unenumerated rights will invariably frustrate those looking for a neat and tidy
“bundle” of rights that can be easily listed and referenced.  The rights listed by
Blackstone, and in English common and constitutional law in general, were
maddeningly vague and imprecise.  This is mainly because Great Britain had
no supreme court armed with the power of judicial review to settle
controversies over the meaning of specific rights.   As a result, most rights305
remained relatively abstract and only became definite when they were analyzed
in specific situations.   Even then, no precise boundaries were established.306 307
English common law and constitutional rights were also vague because there
was a fear that being too specific about rights would impose unduly narrow
interpretations on them.   Thus, rights were only clarified when threatened.308 309
Because rights were vague categories, and because courts were in the
business of “discovering” them rather than creating them, it was simply not
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310. See id.
311. See id. at 25-26.
312. See REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 3-7, 72 (analyzing the historical
approach of “lawyer’s history”).  An example of this line of thinking is the statement by John
Cartwright that 
our object is, to ascertain how [the ancient constitution] was, or must have been,
according to the Constitution at its origin.  It is only by ascending to that point,
we can know what it now is; because, whatever it originally was it continues to be;
no change ever having been made, notwithstanding the numerous changes which
have occurred in the practice of governing.
Id. at 72.
313. See Meyler, supra note 21, at 593.
314. Id. at 593-94.
315. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).  In Heller, both
Justices Scalia and Stevens attempted to interpret the Second Amendment by looking at the law
at the time of the framing.  See id. at 2790-801, 2835-41.
possible to know ahead of time all of the rights that people possessed.  Further,
new rights, or at least new interpretations of them, could emerge over time.310
This is not to say that Americans at the time of the framing believed in a “living
Constitution” with a meaning that would change, but rather that they were heirs
to an English common law tradition that treated all rights, even those recently
“discovered,” as timeless.   Even if the exact expression of the rights might311
change, the rights themselves had always existed.312
IV. What Does It Mean?
These conclusions, taken together, mean that trying to compile a full list of
the rights of Americans, to “enumerate the unenumerated rights,” would be as
futile now as it was in 1787.  Any listing would necessarily be incomplete.  It
would also be against the common law tradition, which depends on an orderly
development of the law on a case-by-case basis.   Instead, what can be313
developed is a mechanism for historically identifying rights as they are
challenged.   In many respects, the system is similar to the historical analysis314
that some members of the U.S. Supreme Court have often performed.   The315
distinction is in the baseline.  Rather than cherry-picking from a variety of
sources, anyone engaging in a historical analysis of a proposed right should
begin with a determination of the right’s status in practice and tradition at the
time of the framing.  The baseline for this determination should be the
collective common law at that time.  As I have suggested above, this should be
discerned by looking to Blackstone’s Commentaries and the categories of rights
contained therein, and also by looking at how those rights had been modified
by American practice at the time of the framing.
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316. See Meyler, supra note 21, at 593 (arguing for a “common law originalism” informed
by the evolving nature of the common law).
317. See POCOCK, supra note 49, at 35-37 (discussing the way the common law changes in
response to new situations).
318. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *129.
319. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961).  
320. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).  It is questionable whether the Court in Glucksberg meant this
to be a true requirement as it did not actually mention this standard again in the opinion.  See
Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 665, 670 n.38 [hereinafter McConnell, Right to Die].
321. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 48 (1996).
322. But see BARNETT, supra note 13, at 259-62.
323. But see Niles, supra note 11, at 122.
To be certain, the baseline formed by Blackstone and American practice at
the time of the framing is just that—a place to start.  A proper historical
analysis must take into account the ways in which the rights established at the
framing have changed throughout this country’s history in response to threats
from government.   It was taken for granted in the common law tradition that316
rights, or at least their interpretations, could change and that new rights could
be discovered.   Thus, the question is whether the right asserted is one that can317
truly be said to have become part of American custom, that is, one that has
come to be thought of as part of the “residuum of natural liberty . . . not
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience.”   In318
this regard, the test should be similar to that enunciated by Justice Harlan in his
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, wherein he stated that due process
“represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for
the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society.”319
It is important to distinguish this standard from the other standards that the
Court has used in talking about substantive due process.  On the one hand, the
common law standard is not one that seeks to protect only those rights
“‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.’”   Nor is it a standard that protects only320
those rights that are “so deeply rooted . . . as to be . . . fundamental
principle[s].”   On the other hand, the common law standard is not one that321
goes so far as to provide a presumption of individual freedom for all rightful
conduct  or one that protects generalized rights such as “the right to personal322
freedom and autonomy.”   Rather, the common law standard attempts to find323
the balance between the interests of the individual and the interests of society.
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324. See Meyler, supra note 21, at 593.
325. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
326. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *450-52 (explaining the parent’s obligation and
power to educate the child).  Blackstone noted that those parents who could afford it were free
to decide how to provide the education. Id. at *451.  This right was not entirely without
consequence, however.  As Blackstone noted, a parent who sent his child overseas for the
purpose of attending a “popish college” or being instructed in the “popish religion” was liable
for a fine of one hundred pounds.  Id.
327. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
328. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *427 (“At common law every man might use
what trade he pleased.”).  Blackstone noted that some statutes limited certain professions to
those who had apprenticed in them, but stated that these statutes were strictly construed.  Id. at
*427-28.
329. 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888); see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *138 (detailing the
right to property).
330. 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941); see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *134 (defining
“personal liberty” in part as the right to “remov[e] one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own
inclination may direct”).
331. 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
The exact location of this balance must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.324
A. Some Conclusions . . . 
Although my suggested approach requires a case-by-case analysis, there are
some conclusions that can be drawn regarding unenumerated rights using the
common law, and specifically Blackstone, as a baseline.  First, there are a
number of rights currently recognized as fundamental that would easily be
recognized as fundamental to some extent under this baseline, either explicitly
or implicitly.  These “easy cases” include the right to educate one’s children in
private schools, a right announced in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.   This right325
can be inferred from the general control granted to parents over education for
their children.   The right “to engage in any of the common occupations of326
life,” as articulated in Meyer v. Nebraska,  also falls within the ambit of327
Blackstone’s common law.   The same is true for Powell v. Pennsylvania’s328
right to acquire, hold, and sell property  and Edwards v. California’s right to329
travel.  330
Second, there are rights that, although not “easy cases,” can nevertheless be
inferred from the common law baseline or from the development of custom.
One example is the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment established in
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.   While331
Blackstone reported that suicide, whether assisted or not, was ranked “among
the highest crimes” and resulted in criminal liability for the person committing
suicide and anyone aiding him, no such prohibition was extended to the refusal
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332. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *189 (explaining the crime of “self-murder”).
333. See 1 id. at *134.  
334. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
335. See SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 11 (1964)
(observing that neither Blackstone nor any of the prominent political philosophers frequently
cited at the time recognized an enforceable right to privacy at common law).
336. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *433-45 (restating the common law with respect
to the spousal relationship).
337. Id. at *442.
338. Id. at *443.
339. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *223 (noting, in the context of a discussion of
the crime of burglary, that “the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the
immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with
impunity”).  The protection of the sanctity of the home also extended to privacy and enjoyment,
as evidenced by the strictures against eavesdropping and nuisance.  See id.
340. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
of treatment.   Under such circumstances, a right to refuse medical treatment332
can fairly be said to fall under Blackstone’s more general right to personal
security, which includes “security from . . . corporal insults” and the
“preservation of a man’s health from such practices as may prejudice or annoy
it.”   Although it may seem odd to speak of refusal of treatment in terms of333
“preservation of health,” the point to remember is that the right is a personal
one and should be judged from the perspective of the one asserting it.
Another example is the right of married couples to use contraception, a right
declared in Griswold v. Connecticut.   There was not a generalized “privacy334
right” at common law.   Nor, on a more specific level, did the common law335
deal with contraception.  The common law did, however, contain a strong
tradition of marriage based on contract.   Under the common law, husband and336
wife were considered one person.   They were not allowed to testify against337
each other, except where the offense was “directly against the person of the
wife.”   The common law also contained a strong bias in favor of protecting338
private conduct in the home.339
A definitive answer to the question whether married couples have a right to
use contraception requires an examination of the nation’s customs and
traditions regarding state regulation of the marital relationship.  Such an
examination provides more evidence in support of the right.  As Justice Harlan
observed in his dissent in the earlier case of Poe v. Ullman concerning a similar
statute, enforcement of the prohibition against the use of contraceptives would
require states to invade the privacy of the marital relationship, which Harlan
recognized as “an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage,
an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and in
every age it has fostered and protected.”   Harlan noted that Connecticut’s340
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341. Id. at 554.
342. See id. at 501, 507-09 (majority opinion).  In making the determination that the case
was not ripe for adjudication because fear of enforcement of the statute was unfounded, the
Court noted that “[t]he undeviating policy of nullification by Connecticut of its anti-
contraceptive laws throughout all the long years that they have been on the statute books
bespeaks more than prosecutorial paralysis.”  Id. at 502.
343. See id. at 549-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (detailing protections for the home provided
by the Constitution).
344. See id. at 550-51 (citing a long line of cases expanding the Fourth Amendment search
warrant requirements against both the federal government and, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states).
345. Whether the right to possess contraception extends outside the marital relationship is
a different question that requires a different analysis.  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck
down a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to an unmarried person; however, that
case was decided under the Equal Protection Clause using a rational basis standard.  See 405
U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972). 
346. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
347. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *215-16.  Blackstone referred to homosexual
conduct as a “crime against nature.”  Id. at *215.
348. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution in
statute was an “utter novelty” in that no other state had ever chosen to forbid the
use of contraceptives by married persons through a criminal statute.   Indeed,341
Connecticut itself had apparently enforced its statute only one time in eighty-
two years, a consideration that contributed to the Court’s dismissal of the
declaratory judgment action filed in Poe for lack of justiciability.   Further,342
practice in America had extended the traditional common law bias in favor of
private conduct in the home.   As Justice Harlan pointed out, the Court’s343
decisions under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments had broadened the
scope of the protection of the home beyond its original application.344
The fact that states did not traditionally regulate the use of contraceptives by
married persons and the fact that Connecticut itself did not choose to enforce
its own prohibition provide ample evidence that Americans did not consider the
subject one that governments were entitled to regulate.  This, combined with the
sanctity of the marriage relationship at common law and an American tradition
in favor of marital privacy in general, suggests that Griswold was decided
correctly.345
Harder questions arise in cases where the common law baseline is in fact not
favorable to the existence of a right.  An example of such a case is Lawrence v.
Texas, wherein the Court found that same-sex couples have a liberty interest in
private sexual conduct.   On the one hand, there is no question that, at346
common law, homosexual conduct was considered a crime that the government
was free to prohibit.   Further, throughout America’s history, states have347
passed laws prohibiting this type of conduct.   On the other hand, there is a348
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Support of Respondent at 11-12, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003
WL 674354, at *11-12.
349. See Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 7-9, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152350, at *7-9;
Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Professors Bruce A. Ackerman et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 24-25, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 136139, at *24-25;
Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas in Support
of Petitioner at 15-23, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164132, at *15-
23.
350. See State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942, 946-47 (Tex. 1994).
351. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
353. See McConnell, Right to Die, supra note 320, at 681-82 (endorsing such an approach
as legitimate).
354. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
good deal of evidence suggesting that such prohibitions have rarely been
enforced against individuals engaged in private conduct.   In fact, the statute349
at issue in Lawrence had never been enforced, and a previous case in equity
challenging the statute had been dismissed by the Texas Supreme Court on the
basis that the appellant had not demonstrated a threat of imminent
enforcement.   350
Lawrence represents a constitutionally close case, one that pits a tradition of
regulation, although not necessarily enforcement, against a tradition of
noninterference in private relationships.  Although Lawrence shares some
similarities with Griswold in that the statute at issue regulated private conduct
in the home and was sparsely, if ever, enforced, there are significant
differences.  The common law had very little to say on the matter of possession
of contraception.   The same cannot be said regarding homosexual relations,351
which were extensively prohibited.   Thus, the baseline is different.  Further,352
unlike the situation in Griswold, the strong traditional common law bias in
favor of marital relations does not apply to same-sex relations.  Therefore,
under the common law methodology I propose, in order to establish an
unenumerated right to private relations broad enough to encompass same-sex
relations, the petitioners in Lawrence would have needed to establish that the
tradition of respect for private relations within the home had evolved to the
point where the long-standing tradition of regulation of homosexual conduct at
common law was no longer truly the tradition and custom of American
society.   Given the evidence relating to the nonenforcement of antisodomy353
statutes against private parties, such a showing would have been possible, but
it would certainly have been a near-run thing.
A more extreme example of a right not supported by the common law
baseline is the right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade  and reaffirmed in354
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355. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
356. Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 132, with Robert M. Byrn, Abortion on Demand: Whose
Morality, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 9-10 (1970), and Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy:
The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 823 (1973) [hereinafter Byrn,
American Tragedy].  The confusion stems from the different terminology employed by Coke
and Blackstone.  Coke used the phrase “quick with child,” which has been interpreted to mean
“quickening,” which occurs when the mother can feel the child move.  See Byrn, American
Tragedy, supra, at 822-23.  Blackstone used both the phrase “quick with child” and the phrase
“the point at which the child is able to stir in the mother’s womb,” which occurs sometime
earlier.  See id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
357. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *129.  Blackstone stated that the right to life
“begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother’s womb.  For
if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb . . . this,
though not murder, was by the antient [sic] law homicide or manslaughter.”  Id. at *129.  But,
he noted that “the modern law doth not look upon this offence in quite so atrocious a light, but
merely as a heinous misdemeanor.”  Id. at *129-30.  
358. 410 U.S. at 136; see also id. at 132-36 (discussing abortion at common law).
359. See, e.g., John R. Connery, The Ancients and the Medievals on Abortion: The
Consensus the Court Ignored, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 123 (Dennis Horan et al.
eds., 1987); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Abortion and the Law: Blackmun’s Distortion of the
Historical Record, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 137; Byrn, American
Tragedy, supra note 356, at 815-27.
360. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174-76 & n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing the laws of thirty-
six states or territories that had enacted abortion-limiting statutes by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868); see also Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 281-82 (1992).  Siegel argues that the statutory prohibitions were part of a campaign
by physicians based in part on the idea that “abortion at any stage of pregnancy was an
unwarranted destruction of human life.”  Id. at 282.
361. See Siegel, supra note 360, at 282. 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.   The baseline355
for the right to abortion is clear: Blackstone’s version of the common law held
that abortion after the infant was able to stir within the womb, usually thought
to be at sixteen to eighteen weeks of pregnancy, but possibly as early as eight
to ten weeks,  was a violation of the child’s right to life.   Although Justice356 357
Blackmun’s majority opinion in Roe attempted to infuse some doubt into the
status of the common law crime of abortion, stating at one point that research
“makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a
common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus,”  his358
opinion was based on faulty history and was quickly debunked by scholars.359
Moreover, in the years following the framing, the majority of the states that
had previously followed the common law enacted statutory prohibitions on
abortion.   Many of these statutes criminalized even abortions occurring before360
quickening.   A large number of antiabortion statutes continued in effect until361
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362. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.2 (chronicling statutes in effect in 1972); see also id. at 175-
77 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (chronicling the statutes enacted before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment that “remained substantially unchanged” at the time the Court decided
Roe).
363. See Janessa L. Bernstein, The Underground Railroad to Reproductive Freedom:
Restrictive Abortion Laws and the Resulting Backlash, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1463, 1463-65
(2008).  Bernstein notes that “[s]ince almost immediately after the United States Supreme
Court’s landmark 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, state legislatures have continued to impose,
and the Court has consistently upheld, restrictions on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.”
Id. at 1463.
364. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *129.
365. See id. at *129-31.  Blackstone’s right of personal security “consists in a person’s . . .
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.”  Id. at
*129.
366. Compare, e.g., Martin J. Buss, The Beginning of Human Life as an Ethical Problem,
47 J. RELIGION 244, 245 (1967) (arguing that “English common law located the beginning of
the human soul at ‘quickening’”), with Byrn, American Tragedy, supra note 356, at 824
(arguing that the quickening standard was established for evidentiary reasons).
367. See supra notes 360-62 and accompanying text (discussing the history of abortion
regulation in the United States pre-Roe).
the Court’s decision in Roe.   Further, post-Roe, states have continued to pass362
legislation regulating abortion to the extent allowed by the Supreme Court’s
decisions.   Thus, the common law baseline, combined with the American363
tradition allowing regulation of abortion, both pre- and post-Roe, strongly
suggests that there is no customary right to an abortion, at least after
quickening.
The status of the right to an abortion prequickening, however, is a different
matter.  The time when an infant could stir in the mother’s womb marked the
time at common law when a fetus, at least according to Blackstone, was deemed
to have a right to life.   Prior to that time, it seems that the fetus might be364
considered part of the mother, in which case Blackstone’s right to personal
security might give the mother the right to abort.   This is by no means clear,365
however.  Certainly, abortion was not regulated before quickening under the
common law.  But, whether this is because of problems related to proving
pregnancy prequickening or because of the distinction concerning when the
right to life actually begins is a subject of some controversy.   Adding to the366
controversy is the tradition in pre-Roe American law of attempting to regulate
abortion prequickening.   From a historical standpoint, all of these things need367
to be taken into account in order to determine whether and under what
circumstances an abortion right exists.  It is difficult to see how a court could
make such a determination without addressing the thorny issue of when the
right to life, from a legal standpoint, attaches.
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368. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 10-14, 34-36 (2002) (summarizing the
originalist viewpoints of Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Steven Calabresi, Gary Lawson, and
Justice Scalia).
369. See Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 774
(2004) (describing the common law method of adjudication).
370. Id. at 774 & n.50.  As Lord Mansfield stated in 1744, over time, the common law would
“work itself pure.”  Id. (citing Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 22-23 (K.B.)).
371. See McConnell, Right to Die, supra note 320, at 697-98 (describing Justice Harlan’s
Poe dissent as based on historical rather than moral or philosophical judgments).
372. Compare, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (characterizing the right
at issue as the right of “homosexuals to engage in sodomy”), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 572 (2003) (characterizing the right at issue as the liberty of “adult persons [to decide] how
These are just a few examples of ways in which substantive due process
cases would have been decided under the theory that I espouse.  The case list
is not meant to be complete; however, I hope that it is sufficient to give the
reader a sense of how the method itself would work.
B. . . . And Some Criticisms
There are a number of criticisms that can be leveled against the method that
I have set out.  For one, it can be argued that my method does not sufficiently
constrain judicial discretion.  One of the supposed attractive qualities of the
historical analysis of rights is that it meaningfully constrains judges rather than
allowing them the discretion to enact their own moral or political judgments.368
If there is room in a historical theory for judges to insert such judgments, then
this attractiveness is diminished.
It is admittedly true that there is room in a common law-based historical
theory for judicial discretion.  This, however, is historically accurate because
the common law expected judges to exercise discretion in discovering the
law.   Decisions that were incorrect could be worked out of the law in the369
fullness of time.   Whether this is appealing as a construct is beside the point.370
It is simply not historical to try to use history to constrain judges in a way in
which they were not historically constrained.  If we accept the historical basis
for rights, we must accept the method as well.
Further, there is less discretion in the common law-based theory than might
be supposed.  Because it requires judges to start with a common law baseline
and then to address any evolution of tradition regarding the purported right,
judges are not free to decide cases based on their own moral or philosophical
leanings.   Rather, a large part of the judicial discretion comes in determining371
the “level of abstraction” at which the right should be viewed.  The level of
abstraction issue has continually vexed courts and is a major problem for almost
all historical theories of rights that rely on tradition.   To a certain extent,372
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to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note
10, at 12 (discussing the level of abstraction problem in looking at tradition). 
373. See Schauer, supra note 369, at 774.
374. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 13; GERBER, supra note 11; Niles, supra note 11.
375. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.  Although more restrictive than some approaches, the
method that I describe is much more expansive with regard to rights than those historical
methods suggested by originalists such as Justice Scalia, who would apply a restrictive test to
the evolution of traditions.  See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 368, at 52 (discussing Justice
Scalia’s narrow interpretation of tradition). 
376. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 12 (arguing that “the focus on tradition confuses
descriptive and normative inquiries”).
377. For instance, I tend to favor individual privacy rights to a greater degree than does my
proposed method.  
however, reliance on Blackstone as a common law baseline helps to ameliorate
this problem.  Where the activity is expressly regulated by Blackstone’s
interpretation of the common law, as is, for example, assisted suicide, there is
no level of abstraction problem; rather, the baseline itself provides the
appropriate level.  The level of abstraction problem only comes in where, as in
the case of the right to refuse medication or nourishment, Blackstone is silent.
At that point, a judge must make a decision regarding the scope of the right of
personal security.  This, however, is the type of decision that judges are
qualified to make, and the way is not without guideposts.
There is also some leeway for judicial discretion in identifying exactly when
a “tradition” can be said to exist.  Again, however, this is the kind of judgment
that a judge is qualified to make by looking at history.  It is also the kind of
determination that common law judges were expected to make.373
On the other end of the spectrum, the method that I propose is vulnerable to
the charge that it does not properly protect individual rights to the extent
contemplated by the framers’ rhetoric or by natural law.  Certainly, the method
is more restrictive of rights than some other historically based methods
suggested by advocates of baselines drawn from natural law philosophy or
baselines of personal autonomy.   Nevertheless, this reflects the actual practice374
and understanding at the time of the framing.  While it is true that Americans
at the time of the framing talked of rights in expansive terms, their actual
conception of rights was narrower and included a number of governmental
restrictions on personal autonomy.375
The method is also vulnerable to charges that it is not a “desirable”
interpretation of the Constitution.   Desirability, however, is beside the point.376
I make no claim that a method based on tradition is one that will result in
decisions that are the “best” public policy or even that align with my personal
views regarding what a constitution should protect.   Rather, my claim is377
simply that starting from a common law baseline, using Blackstone, and then
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surveying American tradition and custom gets close to the general
understanding and philosophy of rights adhered to by the public at the time of
the framing of the Constitution and the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  And
from a historical standpoint, that is what matters. 
Conclusion
The Ninth Amendment makes clear that the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights are not the only rights that the people possess.  In developing a
historically based theory of unenumerated rights, the important question is,
what did the people at the time of the framing understand their rights to be?  An
examination of the common law heritage of colonial Americans, as well as the
circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, suggests that the “rights retained by the people” were not
mere philosophical musings from natural law philosophers, but instead were
common law rights that the people felt they were entitled to by reason of their
heritage and that formed the barrier between what government could and could
not do.  By the time of the framing and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
prevalent source consulted for an explanation of these rights was Blackstone’s
Commentaries.  The Commentaries provided a coherent and rational
organization of the common law that could be readily understood.
Nevertheless, accepting Blackstone as the common law baseline for rights
only goes part of the way.  Just as Americans at the time of the framing were
heirs to the common law understanding regarding what rights existed, they were
also heirs to the common law understanding that the full extent of their rights
had not been discovered.  Although they did not and could not know the full
extent of their rights, they believed that courts would adjudicate the boundary
between the power of the government and the rights of the individual, and that
tradition would form the basis of such an adjudication.
Using Blackstone’s Commentaries as the common law baseline for
unenumerated rights and then using tradition derived from custom and practice
to draw the line between legitimate government action and the rights of
individuals provides a coherent framework for the identification of
unenumerated rights.  From this framework, courts can transform the “common
law rights of Englishmen” into the “rights of Americans.”  Although this
methodology cannot provide a definitive list of rights, it can be used to
determine the nature and extent of rights on a case-by-case basis and to properly
allow the “rights retained by the people” to be given effect.
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